





Every new tribunal, erected for the decision of facts, without the
intervention of jury .... is a step towards establishing.., the most
oppressive of absolute governments.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Trial of facts by jury is a deep-seated principle in American juris-
2 3.prudence.2 Enshrined in the Constitution, it was considered by many as
"the very palladium of free government.' 4 In the administrative context,
however, the right to a jury trial has been greatly curtailed. Federal
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1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 380 (1765-69).
2. See WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY'S ORIGINS,
TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1 (2002).
3. The Seventh Amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... U.S. CONST. amend.
VII.
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
5. The Seventh Amendment does not apply to administrative adjudications. See Atlas Roofing
Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977) (holding
that "the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the fact finding function
and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible," even
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administrative agencies can essentially conduct trials without a jury or
the protection of an Article III judge, and their decisions are afforded
great deference on judicial review. 6 Agencies also can directly impact
individual rights through much less formal, so-called informal, adjudica-
tions, accompanied by only minimal procedures that pale in comparison
to a trial.7 Because procedural protections are critical to protect substan-
tive rights, we must closely monitor agency adjudications to ensure that
these rights, and the general public, are properly protected.8
Indeed, the "[m]ultiplication of federal administrative agencies and
expansion of their functions to include adjudications which have serious
impact[s] on private rights" was one of the developments of the modem
administrative state that prompted Congress to enact the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 9 The APA, which governs all federal agencies,1°
where fines can be levied); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937) (re-
jecting the argument that the Seventh Amendment applied to the NLRB's order of reinstatement and
back pay in an unfair labor practice proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act).
6. See infra Parts II and IV.
7. See infra Part 11.
8. The power of procedural protections must not be underestimated: "Assuming that the sub-
stance of the law is not subject to attack, procedural safeguards are the individual's only protections
if [the government] contends that the individual has.not complied with the statutory requirements or
conditions." John Sandberg, Special Project, Fair Treatment for the Licensed Professional: The
Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, 37 MO. L. REV. 410, 410-11 (1972), cited in Cooley
R. Howarth, Jr., Federal Licensing and the APA: When Must Formal Adjudicative Procedures Be
Used?, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 317, 318-20 (1985). Undeniably, "[t]he nature and extent of these proce-
dural safeguards may very well determine whether or not the individual can realistically assert his
claim or defense and thus protect his livelihood." Id. at 411. Moreover, in the administrative law
context, procedures protect not only the individuals involved in the adjudication but also the general
public. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876-77 (1978) (noting that
"[t]he panoply of protections provided by the APA is necessary not only to protect the rights of an
applicant for less stringent pollutant discharge limits, but is also needed to protect the public for
whose benefit the very strict limitations have been enacted").
9. Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 872 (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-37
(1950)).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006). The APA defines "agency" broadly:
"Agency" means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it
is within or subject to review by another, but does not include-
(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia;
or, except as to the requirements of section 552 of this title-
(E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organi-
zations of the parties to the disputes determined by them;
(F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory; or
(H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739, 1743, and 1744 of title 12; chapter 2 of
title 41; or sections 1622, 1884, 1891-1902, and former section 1641(b)(2), of title 50,
appendix ....
Id. § 551(1).
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provides procedures for the two primary activities in which agencies en-
gage: adjudication and rulemaking.11 These activities are further catego-
rized by the level of procedural formality: formal and informal.' 2 To-
gether, the type of activity and the level of formality determine the set of
accompanying procedures that must be followed.' 3 Formal procedures
provide protections that are generally comparable to those available in a
civil judicial trial.14 By contrast, informal procedures require far fewer
protections for individuals; although the APA specifies procedures for
informal rulemaking, it does not mandate any particular procedures for
informal adjudications.1
5
An agency must follow the APA's formal procedures when an
agency adjudication is "required by statute to be determined on the re-
cord after opportunity for an agency hearing."'16 Accordingly, Congress,
through an agency's organic or enabling act, dictates when an agency
must follow formal procedures. An enabling statute can explicitly call for
formal or informal procedures under the APA, 17 but when the statute is
11. The APA defines "adjudication" as the "agency process for the formulation of an order,"
id. § 551(7), and defines "order" as "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but
including licensing." Id. § 551(6). "Rule making" is defined as the "agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule." Id. § 551(5). Consequently, the distinction between adjudication and
rulemaking hinges largely on the definition of"rule":
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval
or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorgani-
zations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefore or of valua-
tions, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.
Id. § 551(4).
12. See id. § 553 (prescribing procedures for informal rulemaking); id. § 554 (relating to adju-
dications); id. §§ 556-557 (prescribing procedures for formal rulemakings and formal adjudica-
tions). These provisions are described in detail infra Part II.A-B.
13. Congress can also substitute another set of procedures in an enabling act for those in the
APA, or require more procedures than are mandated by the APA. In this sense, APA procedures act
as a default set of procedures for agencies to follow absent more explicit instructions from Congress.
14. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2006). These requirements are discussed in detail infra in Part
II.A. See also Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of
the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 473, 495 (2003). The APA's formal procedures are not, however,
exactly those guaranteed in a civil trial. For instance, APA procedures do not always require cross-
examination; the agency must allow for cross-examination only "as may be required for a full and
true disclosure of the facts." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2006).
15. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (specifying procedures for informal rulemaking) with id.
§ 554 (not specifying procedures for informal adjudication). See also § 555, which applies to all
agency actions under the APA, not to only informal adjudications. These provisions are discussed
further infra Part II.A.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2006).
17. Congress can also call for "hybrid" procedures that require more than the minimum infor-
mal procedures but fall short of the APA's full formal procedures. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amend-
Seattle University Law Review
not explicit, agencies and courts end up determining which procedures
are required. This Article will address whether agencies or courts are best
suited for this task.
Given the opportunity, agencies will usually choose informal pro-
cedures over formal ones.' 8 Not surprisingly, "the trend is toward the
elimination of procedural formality in favor of procedural efficiency."' 19
The Supreme Court first encouraged this trend in the 1970s by severely
limiting the application of the APA's formal rulemaking procedures
20
and by denying courts the power to supplement the APA's informal
rulemaking procedures with additional procedural protections. 21 Even in
the adjudicative setting, where procedural protections are more rigorous,
the Court's current constitutional prescription for procedural rights under
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is an
informal hearing: "something less than an evidentiary hearing is suffi-
cient prior to adverse administrative action. 2
The Court's approach to judicial review of agency statutory inter-
pretation has also followed this trend toward efficiency. Its 1984 decision
in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council23 expanded the
circumstances in which courts must defer to agency interpretations of
regulatory statutes. Under Chevron, a court must first ask whether Con-
24gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If not, the
court must defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation.25 The adop-
tion of the "Chevron doctrine," as it is commonly known, has spawned a
vast range of issues for litigation and scholarly commentary.26
ments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2006) (containing substitute procedures falling between the
APA's informal and formal rulemaki-g requirements).
18. See William Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 881, 892 (2006) (asserting that agencies never choose formal procedures for adjudications
when given an option); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes ofAdmin-
istrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 163-80 (2000) (discussing the growing tendency of
agencies to use informal procedures).
19. Howarth, supra note 8, at 320. See also, e.g., Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v.
Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 18-19 (ist Cir. 2006) (upholding a new agency interpretation changing pro-
cedures from formal to informal for the permitting process under the Clean Water Act).
20. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 235 (1973) (holding that an ad-
ministrative agency could reach a decision through means other than a trial-type hearing).
21. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543
(1978) (holding that judicial hybrid rulemaking is not permissible; courts can only compel agencies
to follow procedures that are required by the Constitution or "extremely compelling circumstances").
22. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
23. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a more detailed discussion of Chevron and its progeny, see infra
Parts 1II.B and IV.
24. Id. at 842.
25. Id. at 843-44.
26. Articles about Chevron are too numerous to list completely here. See Jerry L. Mashaw,
Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Ac-
[Vol. 30:541
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This Article does not seek to critique Chevron as an administrative
or constitutional law doctrine. Rather, taking Chevron and its progeny as
the current state of the law, it argues that agency interpretations of their
enabling statutes' procedural provisions should lie beyond "Chevron's
domain." 27 The Article specifically focuses on provisions that dictate
whether formal adjudicatory procedures are required and how the type of
procedures impacts individual rights.
Today, no uniform approach exists to determine what statutory lan-
guage triggers the APA's formal adjudicatory procedures. Historically,
courts have taken three divergent approaches when a statute is not clear.
The first approach is a presumption in favor of informal procedures.28
The second approach employs the opposite presumption; it requires for-
mal procedures absent evidence of congressional intent to the contrary.
29
The third approach grants Chevron deference to the agency's reasonable
interpretation. 30 This third and most recent approach appears to be a
growing trend, one that in 2006 caused a federal circuit court to abandon
its longstanding precedent calling for a presumption in favor of formal
countability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 185, 229 n. 116 ("The loss of forests neces-
sary to make the paper to print all of the articles written on the proper standard of review in inter-
preting statutes following [Chevron] might well have justified requiring the Supreme Court to issue
an environmental impact statement along with the opinion."). In addition to the works cited else-
where in this Article, some important contributions include: Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); John F. Duffy, Administrative Com-
mon Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpreta-
tion and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Thomas
W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Jonathan T.
Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Def-
erence with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chev-
ron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 301 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Deci-
sionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
27. I borrow this term from one of the most significant articles about Chevron, Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001). While I was a student at
Northwestern University School of Law, I had the honor of serving as a research assistant for
Professor Merrill. A long overdue thank you to him for introducing me to the wonderful world of
administrative law.
28. See City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983). For a detailed discussion
of this case, see infra Part III.A.
29. Until recently, the First Circuit followed this approach. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League
v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 (1st Cir. 1978) (creating a presumption in favor of formal procedures,
rebuttable by evidence of clear congressional intent). But see Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC
v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2006) (abandoning the Seacoast approach in favor of Chev-
ron deference). For a detailed discussion of these cases, see infra Part 111.
30. The D.C. Circuit takes this approach. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d
1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The First Circuit now follows this approach. See Dominion Energy,
443 F.3d at 12. For a detailed discussion of these cases, see infra Part 1II.
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procedures and to defer to an agency's reinterpretation of statutory lan-
guage in the name of efficiency.31
This Article is critical of this trend toward granting deference to
agency interpretations of whether their enabling statutes require formal
adjudicatory procedures. It argues that, in determining whether APA
formal procedures are required, neither Chevron deference nor presump-
tions are the proper solution.3 2 Instead, a case-by-case, de novo review is
necessary, leaving courts, not agencies, to have the final word on such
interpretations.33
Part II of the Article outlines the procedures required by the APA
for agency adjudications. Part III discusses the three primary approaches
that courts have followed to determine what triggers formal adjudicatory
procedures and introduces the Chevron doctrine. Part IV examines how
courts review agency interpretations of statutory provisions under
31. See Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 12 (abandoning precedent of twenty-eight years in re-
sponse to a new EPA interpretation of the Clean Water Act).
32. Surprisingly few commentators have focused on this issue. See, e.g., Gary J. Edles, An
APA-Default Presumption for Administrative Hearings: Some Thoughts on "Ossifying" the Adjudi-
cation Process, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 787, 815-16 (2003) (arguing for less formal procedures and
legislative change); Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., Restoring the Applicability of the APA's Adjudicatory
Procedures, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2004) (arguing that "amending the APA to expand the
procedural protections offered to the participants in federal adjudicatory proceedings should not even
be necessary"); John F. Stanley, Note, The "Magic Words " of§ 554: A New Test for Formal Adjudi-
cations Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1070 (2005) (arguing for
Skidmore deference and not addressing presumptions).
33. While some scholars and the American Bar Association (ABA) have argued for legislative
change to the APA to resolve this circuit split, legislative action is likely to be neither politically
achievable nor normatively desirable. Just over a year before the First Circuit's flip in Dominion
Energy, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution that urged Congress to codify in the APA
a presumption favoring formal proceedings. See American Bar Association, Federal Administrative
Adjudication in the 21st Century Act, A Bill, adopted by the House of Delegates, Feb. 14, 2005,
available at http://www.abanet.org/jd/ncalj/pdf/res 14 apa.pdf (urging Congress "to modernize the
adjudication provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and to extend certain fundamental fair
hearing provisions to additional hearings required by statute"). The ABA recently reiterated this
position to the House Judiciary Subcommittee. Letter from Eleanor D. Kinney, Chair, ABA Section
of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, to the Honorable Chris Cannon, Chair of the U.S.
House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law (July 25,
2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/109th/adminlaw/apa72506.pdf. Several
scholars have individually advocated this view as well. See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Um-
brella: Extending the APA 's Adjudicatory Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Stat-
ute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1004-05 (2004) (arguing for legislative change); Howarth, supra note
32, at 1043 (supporting the ABA's proposal for codifying a presumption in favor of formal adjudica-
tory procedures). But Congress has rarely amended the APA since its enactment in 1946, despite
debate by courts and commentators on a number of issues. See Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative
Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 253 (1986). It therefore seems
unlikely that Congress will adopt the ABA's proposal, especially in light of the First Circuit's deci-
sion to reject the presumption and instead apply Chevron deference. Even if legislative change is
politically achievable, it will take time, and courts do not have control over when the issue will ap-
pear on their dockets. Accordingly, a judicial solution is essential.
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Chevron and its progeny and explores two issues on the fringes of Chev-
ron's domain-interpretations of agency jurisdiction and judicial review
provisions-and the concerns that they raise. Next, using lessons from
these analogous issues, Part V analyzes similar concerns about congres-
sional intent, institutional competency, agency self-interest, and fairness
in the procedural provision context. It then advocates for a contextual
approach to judicial review, which rejects mandatory deference, and pro-
poses an analytical framework for such review based on factors related to
the goals served by procedural formalities. Part V argues that this is the
best approach available to provide long-needed guidance to the courts. In
Part VI, the Article concludes that courts, not agencies, should be the
final interpreters of procedural provisions in enabling statutes.
II. ADJUDICATIONS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The interpretive issue that is the subject of this Article is grounded
in the APA, and thus the APA is the starting point for any analysis. This
Part outlines the APA's procedures for agency rulemaking and adjudica-
tion. It then discusses the question of what statutory language triggers the
APA's requirement for formal procedures.
A. Procedural Packages Under the APA
Distinguishing adjudication from rulemaking is one of the most
critical distinctions in administrative law. 34 Adjudications require the
agency to act like a trial court resolving a dispute, whereas in rulemak-
ing, the agency acts more like a legislature. 35 The most important distinc-
tion, however, is that rulemaking "affects the rights of individuals in the
abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding before the legal po-
sition of any particular individual will be definitely touched by it; while
adjudication operates concretely upon individuals in their individual ca-
pacity. 3 6 Because adjudications involve individual substantive rights
that are concretely and immediately affected by an agency's action,
agencies must comply with constitutional due process in addition to the
APA and other statutory procedures.37
34. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 11-12 (West 3d ed. 2004).
35. See id at 11. See also Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legisla-
tures and Courts-Except When They're Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 80 (2007) (analyzing the
difference between agencies engaged in these activities and courts and legislatures).
36. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 16-21 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1927). Accord Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative
Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 260-65 (1938).
37. The constitutional distinction between rulemaking and adjudication was set out in two pre-
APA Supreme Court decisions, Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (holding that an
2007]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 30:541
The APA sets up a "feast or famine ' 38 paradigm for adjudicatory
procedures. Under the APA, formal adjudications are governed by
§§ 556 and 557,39 which together contain a set of trial-type procedures
that apply to only formal adjudications and formal rulemakings.40 These
formal procedures provide a host of procedural protections.
For example, the agency is required to provide notice of the hearing
and afford an opportunity to participate in that hearing. 41 A qualified pre-
siding officer is to conduct the hearing in a fair and impartial manner and
is given the administrative powers to do so. 42 The APA also places the
burden of proof on the proponent of an adjudicatory order and requires
that such orders be supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evi-
dence appearing in the hearing record. 3 At the hearing, a party is given
the opportunity to present his case or defense by oral or documentary
adjudicatory hearing was required to satisfy constitutional due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment), and Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (dis-
tinguishing Londoner and holding that no hearing was constitutionally required for a matter "in
which all are equally concerned"). These cases stand for the general principle that constitutional due
process requirements apply to adjudications but not to rulemaking. See infra Part V.A.4 for a
discussion of due process.
38. This expression is borrowed from LAWSON, supra note 34, at 198.
39. It is conventional to refer to the APA's provisions by their codification in Title 5 of the
U.S. Code, rather than by section numbers in the enacted bill. Adjudications are also governed by
the procedures set out in 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2006).
40. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2006).
41. Id. § 554.
42. The impartial decisionmaker is usually an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). ALJs perform
many of the adjudicative, judge-like functions carried out by agencies. They can:
administer oaths and affirmations;
issue subpoenas authorized by law;
rule on offers of proof and receive relevant evidence;
take depositions or have depositions taken when the ends ofjustice would be served;
regulate the course of the hearing;
hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues by consent of the
parties;
inform the parties regarding the availability of dispute resolution methods and encourage
use of such methods;
require the attendance at any conference held pursuant to paragraph (6) of at least one
representative of each party who has authority to negotiate;
dispose of procedural requests or similar actions;
make or recommend decisions;
take other action authorized by agency rule.
Id. § 556(c). Although they do not enjoy the life tenure of an Article III judge, ALJs are protected in
the sense that during their tenure they are removable only for good cause as established by the Merit
Systems Protection Board. Id § 7521 (also requiring a hearing "on the record" before the Board). In
addition, the salaries of ALJs are set on a government-wide basis in accordance with regulations set
forth by the Office of Personnel Management. Id. § 5372.
43. Id. § 556(d), (e).
548
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evidence, and, in most situations, will be permitted to conduct cross-
examination. 44
Section 557 outlines the decisionmaking process for the presiding
officer and limits the decisionmaker from engaging in ex parte commu-
nications regarding the merits during the deliberative process. 45 It also
entitles parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law; to make exceptions to prior rulings; and to provide a statement on
the basis for these findings, conclusions, or exceptions.46 Finally, § 557
requires that the record include the rulings on each finding, conclusion,
or exception presented and that all decisions include a statement of
(1) findings and conclusions of law; (2) supporting reasons for these
findings and conclusions; and (3) the appropriate order, rule, sanction,
relief, or denial of relief.
47
While these formal procedures generally apply to agency rate-
making, licensing, and enforcement actions, they do not apply to many
typical agency responsibilities.48 Other than minimum procedures that
apply to all agency actions,49 the APA does not specify a set of proce-
dures to follow when formal adjudication is not required. 50 Agency
procedures in "informal" adjudications," therefore, are limited to those
procedures adopted by the agency, required by the enabling statute, or
required by due process.52
44. Id. § 556(d). Section 556 requires cross-examination only "as may be required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts." Id. Accordingly, whether to allow cross-examination ultimately is
left to the decisionmaker's discretion.
45. Id. § 557(d)(1).
46. Id. § 557(c).
47. Id. §§ 557(c)(A)-(B).
48. Levy & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 496. See also 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2006). For example,
agencies frequently engage in informal rulemaking, informal adjudications, and a variety of non-
binding actions, such as investigation, analysis, and planning.
49. Section 555 does provide some protections that apply to all APA proceedings, including
limited rights to appear before an agency; limits on agency subpoena power; the right to retain cop-
ies of information submitted to an agency; the right to inspect copies of testimony transcripts; and
the right to "prompt written notice of the denial of any written petition application or request, includ-
ing a brief explanation of the reasons for the denial." 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2006).
50. Levy & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 496; Morrison, supra note 35, at I 1. As described
above, the APA specifically provides procedures for formal adjudications and formal rulemakings in
§§ 556-557, and for informal rulemaking in § 553. 5 U.S.C. § 553, 556-557 (2006). There is no
corresponding section for informal adjudications.
51. In this sense, informal adjudications, which are not labeled as such in the APA, "constitute
a residual category, including 'all agency actions that are not rulemaking and that need not be con-
ducted through 'on the record' hearings."' City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 644 (7th
Cir. 1983) (quoting Izaak Walton League v. March, 655 F.2d 346, 361-62 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
52. See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 496-97. Thus, "[tihe APA's procedural provisions
are really gap-fillers; they are superseded by specific procedural requirements in an agency's [ena-
bling] statute, whether the [enabling] statute provides for greater or lesser procedural formality than
would otherwise be required by the APA." Id. at 486 n.59. Courts cannot add procedures unless the
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B. Triggering Formal Procedures
Because significant consequences flow from the distinction be-
tween formal and informal procedures (for example, the availability of
an impartial decisionmaker, oral argument, and cross-examination),
understanding what triggers the application of formal procedures is es-
sential. Though the Supreme Court has clearly indicated what triggers
the application of formal procedures for rulemaking, it has not answered
that question for adjudication.
The APA itself does not dictate when agencies must follow the
formal procedures set out in §§ 556 and 557.53 Rather, agencies must
read the APA in conjunction with the relevant agency enabling statute.
The APA uses essentially the same language in the sections governing
rulemaking (§ 553) and adjudication (§ 554) to "trigger" the use of for-
mal procedures. Section 553 indicates that when an agency is engaged in
rulemaking, it must employ formal procedures "[w]hen rules are required
by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for agency hear-
ing.",54 Similarly, § 554 indicates that an agency must employ the formal
procedures in §§ 556 and 557, along with certain procedures in § 554,
"in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing., 55 Agencies thus must
consult their enabling statutes to determine if the statute requires a par-
ticular agency proceeding to be made "on the record after opportunity for
agency hearing.
56
Although the APA's rulemaking and adjudication provisions use
identical language to describe the applicability of formal procedures, the
same legal standard does not necessarily govern the triggering of such
procedures. Some courts have answered the question of what triggers
formal procedures differently depending on whether an agency is
statute or the Constitution demands them. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). For example, judicial hybrid rulemaking was popular until
1978, when the Supreme Court held that, absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling
circumstances, the "administrative agencies 'should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure
and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous du-
ties."' Id. at 543 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)). This holding was reaffirmed
and extended to adjudications in Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV, 496 U.S. 633, 655 (1990)
(holding that an agency engaging in informal adjudication need only meet the requirements of APA
§ 555 unless the Due Process Clause requires more). But the absence of "on the record" language
cannot preclude the application of formal procedures if the Due Process Clause demands them. See
City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at 644 n.1 I (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50-
51 (1950)). See also infra Part V.
53. See City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at 641.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
55. Id. § 554(a).
56. Id. §§ 553(c), 554(a).
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engaged in rulemaking or adjudication. In United States v. Florida East
Coast Railway, the Supreme Court created a presumption against formal
procedures in rulemakings by holding that the statutory phrase "after
hearing" did not trigger formal procedures.57 While the Court declared
that "the actual words 'on the record' and 'after... hearing' used in
§ 553 were not words of art, and that other statutory language having the
same meaning could trigger the provisions of §§ 556 and 557 in rulemak-
ing proceedings, 58 these words have been considered "magic words" in
practice.59
The same is not true for formal adjudications, which are more
common than formal rulemakings. The Supreme Court has never ruled
on the issue of what language triggers formal procedures in the adjudica-
tory context. 60 As a result, lower courts have developed divergent an-
swers to this question. Some cases are clear. For instance, no one would
dispute that formal procedures should be required if the enabling statute
57. 410 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1973). For a detailed discussion of this case, see generally Michael
P. Healy, Florida East Coast Railway and the Structure of Administrative Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV.
1039 (2006).
58. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. at 238 (citing United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972)).
59. See Stanley, supra note 32, at 1073-74 ("In the context of rulemaking, the Supreme Court
addressed this question, and concluded that unless the statute includes the express language 'on the
record,' or 'other statutory language having the same meaning,' formal rulemaking is not re-
quired."). After the Court's decision in Florida East Coast Railway, lower courts generally treated
the presence or absence of "on the record" language as dispositive. See, e.g., Farmers Union Cent.
Exch. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a statutory provision calling
for a "full hearing" required only informal procedures); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 22
(2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a statutory provision calling for a "full opportunity for hearing" required
only informal procedures); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reason-
ing that Florida East Coast Railway "virtually established [the existence of 'on the record' language]
as a touchstone test of when section 556 and section 557 proceedings are required"). Because only a
few rulemaking statutes contain the express "on the record" language, formal rulemaking has practi-
cally vanished as a procedural category. Levy & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 486.
The Court's decision in Florida East Coast Railway fed into a larger movement during that era,
when rulemaking in general was gaining importance as a procedural mode. While adjudication was
the most significant form of agency action before 1960, during the 1960s and 1970s, agencies en-
gaged in a "constant and accelerating flight away from individualized, adjudicatory proceedings to
generalized disposition through rulemaking." Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C.
Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 376. The historical reasons for this flight
to rulemaking are fascinating but beyond the scope of this Article. For a good discussion of this
issue, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J.
185, 189 (1996); Levy & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 474-94.
60. This is not for lack of opportunity, as the Court denied the petition for certiorari in Sea-
coast. At that time, however, only the First and Ninth Circuits had considered this issue, and they
were in agreement about favoring formal procedures. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle,
572 F.2d 872, 877 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Public Serv. Co. v. Seacoast Anti-Pollution
League, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1977) (hold-
ing that formal procedures apply, even absent "on the record language," when the "substantive char-
acter of the proceedings involved" was such that "special procedural safeguards" were needed).
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includes "on the record" language or a specific reference to the APA's
formal procedures. Conversely, if the statute includes no references to
hearings, then almost certainly formal procedures should not be required.
But many statutes require some sort of a "hearing" without expressly
providing that the hearing must be "on the record., 61 Thus, it is these
cases between the extremes that have presented a difficult issue for judi-
cial review, one that has not yielded a consensus approach.
III. DUELING PRESUMPTIONS AND
DEFERENCE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The question of what triggers formal procedures for adjudications
has generated three distinct answers. This Part examines the three ap-
proaches taken by the courts of appeal when they were confronted with
ambiguous statutory language. Until 1984, courts generally followed one
of two presumptions: either a presumption against formal procedures or
one in favor of them. The Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron
produced a third approach, which requires deference to an agency's rea-
sonable interpretation of procedural provisions in its enabling statute.62
The background of these three approaches provides the necessary context
for Part V's argument in favor of a fourth, more appropriate approach.
A. The Original Circuit Split: Dueling Presumptions
The earliest two approaches created by the courts reflect a system
of presumptions. The first approach followed the Supreme Court's lead
in Florida East Coast Railway,63 implicitly creating a presumption
against formal procedures if the statute lacks the magic "on the record"
language.64 The second approach, most prominently adopted by the First
Circuit, distinguished Florida East Coast Railway and instead favored
formal procedures.65
61. See LAWSON, supra note 34, at 221-22.
62. The D.C. Circuit created this approach in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873
F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of this case.
63. 410 U.S. 224 (1973). See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
case.
64. See City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983). The D.C. Circuit also
endorsed this position at one point in time. See U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519,
536 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The D.C. Circuit held that formal procedures were not required because
[w]hile the exact phrase "on the record" is not an absolute prerequisite to application of
the formal hearing requirements, the Supreme Court has made clear that these provisions
do not apply unless Congress has clearly indicated that the "hearing" required by statute
must be a trial-type hearing on the record.
65. See Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 878.
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1. The Seventh Circuit: City of West Chicago v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
In City of West Chicago v. US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
66
the Seventh Circuit addressed whether an order of the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC) complied with the procedural requirements in
the Atomic Energy Act (the Act) and constitutional due process.67 The
court held that the NRC had complied because the APA's formal proce-
dures were not required.68
The NRC had granted an order amending a nuclear facility li-
cense. 69 The City of West Chicago subsequently challenged this order in
federal district court, along with the NRC's delay in adopting the final
decommissioning plan for the site.7° Pursuant to the court's temporary
injunction order, the NRC gave notice to the City and considered the
City's request for a formal hearing, which the NRC ultimately denied.71
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the NRC's order could not
be set aside on procedural grounds because an informal hearing was suf-
ficient.72 While the court noted that the magic words "on the record"
were not essential to a finding that formal procedures were required,73 it
nonetheless declared that, absent this language, there must be clear con-
gressional "intent to trigger the formal, on-the-record hearing provisions
of the APA. ' '74 The statutory language at issue, contained in § 189(a),
provided that the "Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of
any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall
66. 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 638. The City also alleged that the order violated the NRC's own regulations; it was
not supported by substantial evidence in the record; and it was arbitrary or capricious. Id. It further
alleged that the NRC violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA). Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 637. The license amendment authorized the facility to demolish certain buildings and
to accept contaminated soil from off-site locations for on-site storage. Id Before this amendment,
the facility produced thorium and thorium compounds under a source material license, which author-
ized it to possess thorium ores. Id.
70. Id. The City also challenged, under NEPA, the agency's delay in issuing an Environmental
Impact Statement for the plan. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 638.
73. As support, the court cited to Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876
(1st Cir. 1978) and Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1977), both of which
employed a presumption in favor of formal procedures when the statutory language was ambiguous.
74. City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at 641 (citing United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224, 234-38 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-58 (1972);
U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Nofelco Realty Corp. v.
United States, 521 F. Supp. 458, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
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admit any such person as a party to such proceeding. '75 Thus, because
the provision did not contain the "magic words," clear congressional in-
tent to trigger formal adjudicatory procedures was required.76
To discern Congress's intent, the court examined the Act's "thread-
bare" legislative history and concluded that it lacked evidence of a clear
congressional intent for the material license amendments to require for-
mal adjudicatory procedures.77 The court reasoned that whether a formal
hearing was mandated by § 189(a) depended on whether the activity was
governed by the first or second sentence of § 189(a).78 The first sentence
of § 189(a) required the NRC to grant a hearing only if requested by an
interested person in any proceeding involving the granting, suspending,
or revoking of a license or permit.79 Congress did not indicate in this sen-
tence, however, whether the hearing should be a formal one.80 Indeed,
the court noted, Congress showed little concern with the type of proce-
dures required by the hearing provision in the first sentence; instead,
Congress was primarily concerned with nuclear facilities and reactor li-
censes rather than materials licenses.81 Thus, the first sentence of
§ 189(a) did not mandate formal adjudicatory procedures.82
The second sentence of § 189(a), however, reflects a concern for
procedure, distinguishing between the types of licenses by providing that
the NRC shall automatically hold a hearing on certain applications for a
nuclear facility construction permit, even absent a request for a hearing.83
While Congress again left the type of hearing to be held undefined, the
court concluded that formal procedures were required under the second
sentence.84 Although the agency had promulgated a regulation specifying
that a formal hearing is "required by the Act" when the Act mandates a
hearing, even absent a request for one,85 the court nevertheless held that
formal procedures were not statutorily mandated in this instance because
the materials license amendment fell under the first sentence of
§ 189(a).86
75. City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at 638 n.2 (citing the Atomic Energy Act § 189(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2239(a) (2006)).
76. Id. at 641.
77. Id. at 641-42.
78. Id. at 642-43.




83. Id. at 639.
84. Id. at 642.
85. Id. at 639; 40 C.F.R. § 2.104 (1982).
86. City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at 642. The court also held that the NRC's informal hearing
met minimum constitutional due process requirements. The court held that "generalized health,
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Consequently, the West Chicago court effectively created the broad
rule reflected in the circuit split: in an adjudication, there should be a
presumption against formal procedures absent evidence of clear congres-
sional intent to the contrary.87 In both adopting this rule and in support-
ing its specific holding, the court distinguished cases involving specific
fact-finding by an agency, which the court noted fall squarely within the
mainstream of traditional adjudications for which formal procedures
should be used. 8
safety and environmental concerns do not constitute liberty or property subject to due process pro-
tection" and that the City had not presented a sufficient concern to constitute a liberty or property
right. Id. at 645. Even if the court had found a protectable interest, the court noted that the procedure
provided by the Commission constituted sufficient process because the City received a meaningful
opportunity to submit statements and data explaining why the amendment should not be granted. Id.
In doing so, the court found that the agency correctly applied the due process analysis from Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at 646. First, the interest that
would be affected would be a generalized one, and although the interest was public in nature, the
City itself had shown that the interest was of minimal value because it did not object to the issuance
of another amendment with similar procedures. Id. Second, given the nature of the issues and the
lack of disputed issues of material fact, there was little value to oral hearings. Id. Finally, oral hear-
ings involved a great deal of expense for both the agency and the parties. Id. See infra Part V.A.4 for
further discussion of due process requirements in the adjudicatory context.
The court also addressed whether there was sufficient notice, given the agency's regulations and
practice. Id. at 646. First, the court noted that NRC regulations only provided for formal hearings.
See 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.104, 2.105 (1982). Second, the court noted that the "NRC has admittedly always
granted formal hearings on request in materials licensing cases." City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at
646. The NRC, pointing to APA § 552(a), argued that they could "change [their] procedures on a
case-by-case basis with timely notice to the parties involved." Id. at 647. Calling the issue of notice
"a close one," the court found that letters sent by the NRC adequately showed that it "intended to
base its decision on written submissions" and that there was no indication that the City would have
responded differently if it knew the exact scope of the hearing; therefore, there was no prejudice to
the City. Id.
87. Id. at 641. The City also argued that a notice of hearing was required by the NRC regula-
tions even absent a request. Id. at 639-40. The court, however, deferred to the NRC's interpretation
of the Act as requiring formal procedures only when they were specifically requested. Id. The court
reasoned that the determination of whether public interest requires a hearing was left to the NRC's
discretion and held that the NRC could reasonably have concluded that the public interest did not
require a hearing, as the receipt of off-site materials would not damage public health. Id. The court
further held that the NRC's interpretation of its own regulations was not plainly erroneous or incon-
sistent with the text of the regulations. Id. at 641. In deferring to the agency's interpretation of its
own regulations, the court relied on the Seminole Rock doctrine. Id; see also Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (declaring that an agency's construction of its own
regulation "becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation"). Although a discussion of the Seminole Rock doctrine is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, it raises an interesting issue of whether the level of deference is the same or higher than under
Chevron. See infra note 220.
88. City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at 643-44. The court distinguished the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977), and an earlier Seventh Circuit
decision, United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 833 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that formal
procedures were required).
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Despite its reliance on the Supreme Court's bright-line rule for
formal rulemaking procedures in Florida East Coast Railway,89 the Sev-
enth Circuit's reasoning has been criticized, 90 and no other circuits have
expressly adopted its approach. 91
2. The First Circuit: Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle
The primary reason that other courts have not favored the Seventh
Circuit's approach is that they recognize the fundamental distinction be-
tween rulemaking and adjudication as one that is relevant to the formal-
ity of procedures necessary. Rulemakings often focus on broad policy
questions that do not lend themselves well to treatment in adversarial
proceedings, while adjudications often focus on specific factual disputes,
which are better suited to formal procedural mechanisms. 92 Given this
important distinction, these courts reason that when the statute is am-
biguous, courts should be more protective of individual rights in adjudi-
cations.93 "Hearing" requirements in adjudicatory statutes thus should
more often trigger formal APA procedures than should similar or identi-
cal language in rulemaking statutes.94
The First Circuit best articulated this distinction in Seacoast Anti-
Pollution League v. Costle.95 At issue in Seacoast was whether §§ 316
and 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 required
formal adjudication. 96 This Act, commonly known as the Clean Water
Act (CWA), prohibits discharge of any pollutant (including heated water)
unless the point source operator has obtained a discharge permit.
97
The Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSCO) had ap-
plied to the EPA for permission to discharge heated water into an estuary
that runs into the Gulf of Maine.98 Because PSCO's proposed cooling
89. See City of West Chicago, 701 F.2d at 641, 644. For a discussion of Florida East Coast
Railway, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Howarth, supra note 32, at 1044-1047. See also Part V.B infra.
91. One district court in the Seventh Circuit, deciding a case post-Chevron, cited to City of
West Chicago, but the Seventh Circuit has not revisited the issue. See Sibley v. U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
913 F. Supp. 1181, 1186 n.3 (N.D. I11. 1995) (citing City of West Chicago and Chem. Waste Mgmt.,
Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) as support for the court's conclusion that as long as "on
the record" language is not present, an agency can reasonably conclude that formal procedures are
not required). See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of Chemical Waste Management.
92. The Ninth Circuit first articulated this distinction in Marathon Oil, 564 F.2d at 1261.
93. See, e.g., id. at 1263; Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876 (lst Cir.
1978).
94. See Marathon Oil, 564 F.2d at 1261, 1263-64; Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 876.
95. 572 F.2d at 876.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 874 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1362(6)).
98. Id.
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system did not meet the EPA standards,99 PSCO simultaneously applied
for a discharge permit under § 402 of the CWA and an exemption from
the EPA standards pursuant to § 316 of the CWA. 0 0 Under § 316(a),
PSCO would be qualified for an exemption allowing for a lower standard
if, after "an opportunity for public hearing," it could demonstrate that the
EPA standards were "more stringent than necessary" to meet the CWA's
goals of protecting aquatic life. 1° 1 In response to PSCO's application, the
EPA held an informal hearing and subsequently authorized PSCO's
system. 
02
But this did not conclude the matter because a citizen group, Sea-
coast Anti-Pollution League, then requested a formal "on the record"
hearing regarding PSCO's application. 0 3 The EPA granted Seacoast's
request and held public adjudicative hearings before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ), who recommended granting the permit.'0 4 The EPA
Regional Administrator reversed the ALJ's initial decision and denied
PSCO's application. 10 5 PSCO appealed this decision, and a new Admin-
istrator appointed six in-house advisors to a technical review panel,
which ultimately found that PSCO, with one exception, had met its bur-
den of proof and should be granted a permit. 10 6 Seacoast requested a
hearing on the exception (the issue of "backflushing"), on which the
Administrator had requested PSCO to submit further information and
offered the parties a chance to comment on PSCO's submission, but Sea-
coast's request was denied. 10 7 The EPA's final decision followed the
panel's recommendations, prompting Seacoast to appeal to the First
Circuit.10
On appeal, Seacoast argued that §§ 316 and 402 of the CWA re-
quired a formal adjudicatory hearing under the APA. 10 9 Although neither
99. Id.
100. Id. at 874-75. Thermal variance procedures outlined in the CWA are incorporated into
§ 402 permits under § 316(a). See 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006).
101. Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 875. Section 316(a) of the CWA provides for exemptions where
appropriate. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006). The standard to protect aquatic life under this section is that
which is necessary "to assure the protection and propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of
shellfish, fish, and wildlife in and on the body of water." Id.
102. Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 874.
103. Id. at 875.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The panel found that the permit should be granted under an exception to the EPA
standards. Id.
107. Id. The Administrator had stated that he would hold a hearing on any new information
submitted by PSCO if any party requested one and could satisfy certain threshold conditions. Id.
108. Id.
109. The court noted that there was some dispute about whether the hearing was a proceeding
under § 402 or § 316, but concluded that this distinction was not relevant and treated the hearing as a
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
one of these sections contains "on the record" language," 0 the court held
that this precise language was not required for adjudications."' Rather,
the court announced that the issue turned on the substantive nature of the
hearing Congress intended to provide. 12
The court noted three factors that were relevant to the nature of the
hearing. First, the EPA's decision involved specific factual findings
about the effects of heated water discharges from a specific point source,
and these facts formed the basis for granting a permit to a specific appli-
cant. 113 Second, because of the need to make specific factual findings,
this decision was not a general policy decision.' 14 Third, the rights of an
individual party-the specific applicant-were directly impacted."
15
Thus, the court reasoned, because factual questions in permit hearings
will often be disputed, an adversarial hearing employing formal adjudica-
tory procedures would help to ensure reasoned agency decisionmaking as
well as meaningful judicial review. 16 The court concluded that the hear-
ing in this case was "exactly the kind of quasi-judicial proceeding for
which the adjudicatory procedures of the APA were intended."
'"17
Like the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit articulated a broad rule in
the form of a presumption. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, however, the First
Circuit explicitly created the opposite presumption-one in favor of for-
mal procedures. 18 Reasoning that the legislative history and judicial
treatment of the APA supported such a presumption,1 9 the court held
that, unless a statute otherwise specifies, an adjudicatory hearing subject
to judicial review must be on the record.12 Because the court did not
find evidence that Congress intended, either in the statutory text or the
§ 316 proceeding. Id. Interestingly, however, the court then agreed with the Ninth and Seventh Cir-
cuits' conclusion that the APA does not apply to § 402. See id at 876.
110. Both § 316(a) and § 402(a)(1) use the language "after opportunity for public hearing." Id.
at 875 n.3; CWA § 316(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006); CWA § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)
(2006).
111. Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 876. In doing so, the court reasoned that in Florida East Coast
Railway, the Supreme Court rejected such an extreme reading in the context of rulemaking. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The court stressed that while general policy considerations may affect the decision, the




118. Id. at 877.
119. Id. The court further noted that the purpose of § 554's language was to exclude govem-
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legislative history of the CWA, that informal procedures be used in § 316
hearings, it determined that formal procedures were required.12" '
Seacoast and West Chicago thus present "dueling presumptions"',
22
subject to rebuttal by evidence of contrary congressional intent: the Sea-
coast court proposed a presumption that any statutory language calling
for a "hearing" triggers formal adjudication, 123 while the West Chicago
court seemed to presume that the Florida East Coast Railway124 rule
compelling informal procedures in most cases applies equally to rule-
makings and adjudications.' 25 Although the Seacoast court was aware of
the Supreme Court's decision in Florida East Coast Railway, the court
nonetheless reached a different outcome based on the distinction between
rulemaking and adjudication.126
The court reasoned that that this distinction was critical because
hearings serve very different functions in rulemakings and adjudications.
In rulemakings, the court reasoned, the agency hears "legislative" facts in
the sense that the witnesses are not the only source of evidence on which
the agency must base factual findings.127 Moreover, the agency may
121. Id. at 878. The court performed no further statutory analysis and dispensed with the legis-
lative history in a footnote. See id. at 878 n.10. In its analysis of the legislative history, the court
focused on Congress's use of "on the record" language in several sections of the CWA, which pri-
marily pertained to rulemaking. See id. The court reasoned that the absence of this language in sec-
tions relating to adjudications indicated the "logical presumption that adjudications will be denied on
the record unless otherwise specified whereas rule makings need not be unless so specified." Id.
The court also evaluated the hearing's compliance with the APA's formal procedures and re-
manded the case to the EPA for a determination of whether cross-examination would have been
useful. Id. at 880. Because of the Supreme Court's ruling in Vermont Yankee barring judicial hybrid
rulemaking, the court was not free to order cross-examination or any other specific procedures. See
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
122. This term is borrowed from Gary Lawson. LAWSON, supra note 34, at 234.
123. Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 877.
124. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text for discussion of this case.
125. LAWSON, supra note 34, at 234.
126. Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 876, 877 n.9 (citing United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224, 245 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972)). The
court specifically noted that the Supreme Court limited its holding to rulemaking in these cases. Id.
at 877 n.9.
127. Id. at 877. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has explained the distinction between "legisla-
tive facts" and "adjudicative facts" as follows:
Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and
properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the question of who did what, where, when,
how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that
go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties
but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and dis-
cretion.
1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02 (1958). Professor Davis has as-
serted that formal procedures are required when the matter turns on "adjudicative facts" rather than
"legislative facts" because:
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decide not to adopt in its final rule the witnesses' information or view-
point. The court also relied on the Attorney General's Manual of 1947
as further support for its reasoning. 129 Written contemporaneously with
the enactment of the APA and reflecting the APA's legislative history,
the Manual draws a similar distinction between rulemaking and
adjudication:
It is believed that with respect to adjudication the specific statutory
requirement of a hearing, without anything more, carries with it the
further requirement of decision on the basis of the evidence adduced
at the hearing. With respect to rule making, it was concluded, supra,
that a statutory provision that rules be issued after a hearing, with-
out more, should not be construed as requiring agency action "on
the record," but rather as merely requiring an opportunity for ex-
pression of views. That conclusion was based on the legislative na-
ture of rule making, from which it was inferred, unless a statute re-
quires otherwise, that an agency hearing on proposed rules would be
similar to a hearing before a legislative committee, with neither the
legislature nor the agency being limited to the material adduced at
the hearing. No such rationale applies to administrative adjudica-
tion.
130
The court's holding, including the presumption it creates, is strongly
supported by the Manual, which continues:
In fact, it is assumed that where a statute specifically provides for
administrative adjudication... after opportunity for an agency hear-
ing, such specific requirement for a hearing ordinarily implies the
further requirement of decision in accordance with evidence ad-
duced at the hearing. Of course, the foregoing discussion is inappli-
Facts pertaining to the parties and their businesses and activities, that is, adjudicative
facts, are intrinsically the kind of facts that ordinarily ought not to be determined without
giving the parties a chance to know and to meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to
them, that is, without providing the parties an opportunity for trial. The reason is that the
parties know more about the facts concerning themselves and their activities than anyone
else is likely to know, and the parties are therefore in an especially good position to rebut
or explain evidence that bears upon adjudicative facts. Yet people who are not necessarily
parties, frequently the agencies and their staffs, may often be the masters of legislative
facts. Because the parties may often have little or nothing to contribute to the develop-
ment of legislative facts, the method of trial often is not required for the determination of
disputed issues about legislative facts.
Id.
128. Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 877.
129. Id. at 877-78.
130. Id. (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
42-43 (1947)).
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cable to any situation in which the legislative history or the context
of the pertinent statute indicates a contrary congressional intent.1
31
The First Circuit's approach is persuasive for three main reasons.
First, adjudications tend to present more fact-oriented issues than do
rulemakings, which tend to focus more on broad issues of policy. 132 Sec-
ond, the issues that are characteristic to adjudications may be more ame-
nable to formalized procedures than the issues that are characteristic of
rulemakings. 3 3 Thus, as a functional matter, one might be more inclined
to find that formal procedures are required for adjudications than for
rulemakings. Third, adjudications affect individual rights differently than
rulemaking because adjudication has an immediate and concrete ef-
fect. 13 4 Rulemaking, like legislation, is entitled to far less due process
protection than adjudication because rules are generally applicable and
prospective. 1 35
Thus, although Seacoast's presumption is not perfect, 136 it nonethe-
less offers a more sound solution to the question of when formal proce-
dures are triggered than the Seventh Circuit's opposite presumption. Un-
til recently, Seacoast's presumption was the most common approach,
followed by courts in several other circuits, including the Second, Fifth,
Ninth and, for a period of time, the D.C. Circuit.
3 1
131. Id. at 878 (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 42-43 (1947)) (emphasis added by Seacoast court).
132. Id. at 876.
133. Id. at 878.
134. Id. at 876.
135. See supra Part II.A & note 37 regarding the constitutional distinction between rulemaking
and adjudication as articulated by a pair of pre-APA Supreme Court cases; compare Londoner v.
City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908) (holding that the Due Process Clause was
violated because there was no hearing prior to a special assessment of a tax against certain property
owners for the cost of paving a street upon which the lands abutted), with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding that there was no Due Process
Clause violation for an increase of the valuation of all taxable property in Denver).
136. See infra Part V.B.
137. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437, 1444 n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (noting that statutory language calling for a "hearing" presumptively required formal proce-
dures); Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding the Army Corps
of Engineers' refusal to grant a formal hearing in a CWA permit proceeding because congressional
intent indicated that formal hearings were not required); United States v. Indep. Bulk Transp., 480 F.
Supp. 474, 479, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that Congress did not intend to require formal proce-
dures in a Coast Guard adjudication because the factual issues were not complex); Marathon Oil Co.
v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that formal procedures apply, even absent "on
the record language," when the "substantive character of the proceedings involved" was such that
"special procedural safeguards" were needed).
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B. All Aboard the Chevron Train?
The D.C. Circuit has faced the issue of what triggers formal adjudi-
catory procedures more frequently than any other circuit; yet, perhaps as
a result, it did not conclusively decide on an approach for over a decade.
At different points in time, the D.C. Circuit adopted the West Chicago'
and the Seacoast approaches.' 39 But in 1989, the D.C. Circuit faced the
issue once again and rejected both approaches because a key event in
administrative law history had occurred in the interim: the Supreme
Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 140
This 1984 decision "dramatically expanded the circumstances in
which courts must defer to agency interpretations of statutes.'' In
Chevron, the Court held that courts must defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous language in statutes administered by that
agency.142 The pre-Chevron world, by contrast, operated largely on a sys-
tem of presumptions under which the court retained discretion regarding
when to defer to an agency's interpretation. 43 Thus, it is not surprising
that the courts in West Chicago and Seacoast both set up presumptions
about when formal procedures for adjudication are required, albeit
opposite ones.
Yet, the idea that a court should defer to an agency on a question of
law was not new in 1984; it pre-dates the APA's enactment.144 Before
Chevron, however, courts were generally considered to have such a duty
only when Congress expressly delegated authority to an agency "to de-
fine a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provi-
sion. '145 Otherwise, it was generally understood that courts could "sub-
stitute judgment on agency interpretations that could be characterized as
138. See U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding
that formal procedures were not required because "[w]hile the exact phrase 'on the record' is not an
absolute prerequisite to application of the formal hearing requirements, the Supreme Court has made
clear that these provisions do not apply unless Congress has clearly indicated that the 'hearing' re-
quired by statute must be a trial-type hearing on the record").
139. See Union of Concerned Scientists, 735 F.2d at 1444 n.12 (noting that "when a statute
calls for a hearing in an adjudication the hearing is presumptively governed by 'on the record'
procedures").
140. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
141. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 833.
142. 467 U.S. at 843-44.
143. See LAWSON, supra note 34, at 430, 434-35,438; Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation
in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551-52 (1985).
144. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 833.
145. Id. at 833 & n.2 (quoting United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) and
Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)). Courts could, however, still invalidate
administrative interpretations that were contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. Diver, supra
note 143, at 562.
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'questions of law," ' 146 and deference to such interpretations depended on
multiple factors that courts evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 147 Defer-
ence, therefore, was discretionary rather than mandatory. 1
48
Chevron broadened the scope of mandatory deference from express
delegations of interpretive authority to include instances of "implied
delegation" when Congress is silent or leaves language ambiguous in a
statute that an agency is charged with administering. 49 In Chevron, the
Court announced that such statutory gaps and ambiguities are implied
delegations requiring deference. 50 The Court then articulated the famous
Chevron "two-step" analysis: the court must first ask whether Congress
clearly addressed the precise question at issue, and, if not, the court then
must defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation.'15 This expansion of
the scope of mandatory deference had the effect of narrowing the range
of judicial discretion regarding deference, thus altering the relationship
between courts and agencies. 1
52
146. William R. Andersen, Against Chevron-A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 957,
958 (2004).
147. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 833. See also Merrill, supra note 26, at 969,
972-75 (describing three categories of factors: (1) factors addressed to whether Congress intended
courts to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statutory provision, including distinguishing be-
tween legislative rules stemming from a specific delegation of authority and interpretive rules, de-
fined as executive interpretations not backed by specific delegated authority; (2) factors addressed to
the attributes of the particular agency decision at issue, including agency expertise; whether the
administrative interpretations were longstanding and/or uniform; whether the interpretations were
supported by a reasoned analysis; and whether multiple agencies agreed or disagreed about the cor-
rect interpretation of the statute; and (3) factors thought to demonstrate congruence between the
outcome reached by the agency and congressional intent regarding that specific issue); Diver, supra
note 143, at 562 & n.95 (listing factors such as contemporaneous agency construction, longstanding
agency construction, public reliance on agency interpretation, interpretation involving a matter of
"public controversy," agency expertise, agency's rulemaking authority, agency action necessary to
implement a statute, congressional awareness of agency interpretation and subsequent failure to
repudiate it, and agency application of a statute to its proposed action). See also discussion infra Part
IV.
148. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 833; see also Merrill, supra note 26, at 1032
(discussing the difference between the mandatory deference model, which applies to "interpretations
backed by express delegations of regulatory authority from Congress," and the discretionary defer-
ence model, which applies when there is no express delegation).
149. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 833; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). As part of the deliberative process, Congress may remain
silent or purposefully leave language ambiguous for a variety of reasons. See Daniel L. Rotenberg,
Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 375, 392-93 (1992) (identifying,
categorizing, and evaluating various reasons for congressional silences, including in delegations to
agencies).
150. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. The Court then further explained the reasons for delegation. Id.
at 865-66. See infra Parts IV and V for a discussion of these reasons.
151. Id. at 842-43.
152. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 834; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92
VA. L. REV. 187, 188-89, 198 (2006) (stating that Chevron "establish[ed] a new approach to judicial
review of agency interpretations of law" that is now the "undisputed starting point for any assess-
Seattle University Law Review
While Chevron was not necessarily viewed as particularly revolu-
tionary at the time,'5 3 the D.C. Circuit, as the primary venue for federal
administrative law cases, recognized the decision's significance and un-
dertook a third, Chevron-based approach to determining what triggers
formal adjudicatory procedures.
1. The D.C. Circuit: Chemical Waste Management v. U.S. EPA
Facing the issue for the first time since Chevron was decided, the
D.C. Circuit expressly disavowed circuit precedent that had arguably
adopted the Seacoast approach and instead employed the Chevron two-
step analysis. In Chemical Waste Management v. U.S. EPA, 54 the court
held that EPA regulations, 5' which established informal procedures for
administrative hearings concerning the issuance of corrective action or-
ders under § 3008(h) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 156 were a reasonable interpretation of RCRA and were facially
consistent with due process."'
The court first analyzed whether Congress had spoken to the pre-
cise question at issue. Under RCRA, operators of hazardous waste sites
must obtain permits, but facilities that existed before 1980 may operate
as interim facilities pending agency action on their permit applications.
5 8
Section 3008 of RCRA allows the EPA to suspend or revoke permits,
159
and subsection (b) requires that the EPA "promptly conduct a public
hearing" if one is requested within thirty days of a suspension.
60
ment of the allocation of authority between federal courts and administrative agencies," and noting
that Justice Scalia saw Chevron as a revolutionary decision, "one that would fundamentally alter the
relationship between agencies and reviewing courts and renovate what had long been the law").
Although the Court changed prior law by mandating deference in the face of ambiguity, in other
ways, Chevron reflects longstanding precedent employing judicial deference during statutory inter-
pretation. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES: 1989 SUPPLEMENT
TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 505-14 (2d ed. 1989) (suggesting that Chevron reflects long-
standing doctrine); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.34 (3d ed. 1991) (same).
153. See Merrill, supra note 26, at 976; Sunstein, supra note 152, at 197-98 (noting that Justice
Scalia and Justice Breyer had very different understandings of Chevron's impact).
154. 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
155.40 C.F.R. § 24 (1988).
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006). RCRA was enacted in 1976 to establish a comprehen-
sive program to regulate hazardous water management and disposal. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d
at 1478. It was modified by the Hazardous Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-616.
157. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1478.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a), (e) (2006).
159. Id. § 6928.
160. Id. § 6928(b).
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The EPA regulation at issue implemented RCRA's public hearing
provision.161 Under this regulation, formal procedures applied only to
actions involving the suspension or revocation of a permit, or an assess-
ment of civil penalties, 162 because these proceedings involved specific
fact-finding regarding whether someone had violated legal standards and
whether sanctions were appropriate. 63 Informal procedures applied only
to actions requiring facility managers to conduct investigations. 1
64
The court held that the statutory language alone failed to show
Congress had directly spoken to the precise question at issue.' 65 First, the
court noted that subsection (b) requires a "public hearing," but does not
clearly indicate whether Congress intended the utilization of formal or
informal procedures for such hearings.166 Next, the court noted that the
EPA had not previously interpreted the phrase to necessarily or always
require formal adjudication; the EPA had decided to base the type of
hearing on the nature of the issue raised. 167 Finally, the court explained
that it could break from past circuit precedent favoring formal proceed-
ings. 168 In doing so, the court stressed that Seacoast predated Chevron,
which mandates deference to reasonable agency interpretations. 
169
The court then moved to step two of the Chevron analysis and held
that the EPA's regulation allowing for informal hearing procedures was a
reasonable interpretation of the "public hearing" requirement.17 At this
161. See 40 C.F.R. § 22 (1988).
162. See id § 24.01(b)(1)-(2).
163. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1482.
164. Id. at 1479.
165. Id. at 1480-81.
166. Id. at 1480; see 43 Fed. Reg. 34738 (Aug. 4, 1978). Although Congress amended RCRA
in 1984, it did not clarify the type of procedures intended. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1481.
167. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1481. Interestingly, analyzing the consistency of an
agency interpretation is a factor that courts took into account before Chevron was decided. See
Merrill, supra note 26, at 973. It is now a factor under so-called Skidmore deference, discussed infra
in Part IV.B.
168. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1481.
169. Id. at 1482. The court also noted that a Ninth Circuit decision following a presumption in
favor of formal proceedings also predated Chevron. See id (citing Marathon Oil v. EPA, 564 F.2d
1253 (9th Cir. 1977)).
170. Id. at 1483. The court applied the arbitrary or capricious standard of review and required a
reasoned explanation for the EPA's interpretation. Id. at 1482. Scholars and courts have long ques-
tioned what scope of review applies at Chevron's step-two reasonableness inquiry and whether it
differs from APA § 702(a)(2)'s arbitrary or capricious standard. The Supreme Court has not pro-
vided clear guidance on this issue. Consequently, commentators continue to debate the issue. See,
e.g., Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1377, 1377-78 (1997) (arguing that step two of Chevron "concerns the valid-
ity (reasonableness) of the agency's outcome, while the arbitrary or capricious standard ... further
regulates the process by which the agency reached its decision" and that "[t]he two tests work in
tandem"); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron, Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1254-55 (1997) (proposing that both steps of the Chevron analysis should be consoli-
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step in the analysis, the court examined two arguments by the petitioners
that the EPA's interpretation was not reasonable. First, the petitioners
challenged the EPA's claim that the factual issues could be resolved
through written and oral statements and that oral testimony through for-
mal procedures was not necessary.1 71 The court noted that, although for-
mal procedures may be more suited for factual issues, the agency has
discretion to adequately tailor informal procedures to meet the needs of
each case. 172 The court found that the EPA had adequately explained in
its regulation that subsection (h) cases will present fewer factual issues
than other types of RCRA compliance cases, and thus commonly dis-
puted factual issues will arise less often.1 73 Moreover, the court reasoned,
those factual issues that do arise in this context will primarily be techni-
cal or policy matters that generate little need for an assessment of witness
demeanor or credibility, which are better assessed in formal
proceedings.
174
Second, the petitioners challenged the EPA's argument that infor-
mal procedures will result in speedier agency responses to hazardous
waste releases. The court agreed with the petitioners, but indicated that
while the "EPA cannot rely upon the need for swift adjudication to
justify its use of informal hearing procedures," the agency in this case
dated into one arbitrariness review); Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 87 (proposing a "syncopated
Chevron" in which "the first beat of the Chevron two-step" is downplayed and "the second beat" is
emphasized "by requiring reviewing courts to scrutinize more carefully the reasonableness of agen-
cies' statutory interpretation"); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 827-28 (1990) (arguing that Chevron's second step is "not all that
different analytically from the APA's arbitrary and capricious review. In either the second step of
Chevron or in arbitrary and capricious review" because in both types of review the court asks
"whether the agency considered and weighed the factors Congress wished the agency to bring to
bear on its decision"); Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure, and Process: Agency Duties of Explana-
tion for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 341-44 (1996) (describing the different ways
to view step two of the Chevron analysis).
Courts are similarly uncertain. See, e.g., Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ac-
knowledging that Chevron's step two and arbitrary or capricious review "overlap at the margins" but
attempting to carve out separate spheres based on whether the relevant inquiry "is rooted in statutory
analysis and is focused on discerning the boundaries of Congress' delegation of authority to the
agency"); Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("The
explanation that renders the Secretary's interpretation of the statute reasonable also serves to estab-
lish that the final rule was not arbitrary and capricious."); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50,
57 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that "the second step of Chevron analysis and State Farm arbitrary and
capricious review overlap, but are not identical"); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183
F.3d 393, 410 (5th Cir. 1999) ("'Arbitrary and capricious' review under the APA differs from
Chevron step-two review, because it focuses on the reasonability of the agency's decision-making
processes rather than on the reasonability of its interpretation.").
171. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1482.
172. Id. at 1483.
173. Id. at 1482.
174. Id.
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had provided a reasonable explanation for its choice of informal proce-
dures based on the number and nature of factual issues in a typical
case. 175
2. Interlude: National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass 'n v. Brand Xlnternet Services
Despite the significance of Chevron and its progeny over the years,
no circuit had expressly followed the D.C. Circuit's lead until just re-
cently. As discussed below, in April 2006, the First Circuit abandoned its
longstanding presumption in favor of formal procedures and adopted the
Chevron approach. 176 In announcing this shift, the First Circuit relied on
the Supreme Court's 2005 ruling in National Cable & Telecommunica-
tions Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services. 177 It was predominantly this
decision that led the First Circuit to fundamentally shift its approach
from one where the court is the primary interpreter of statutory language
to one in which the court is required to defer to reasonable agency
interpretations. 178 While Brand X does not address interpretations of
175. Id. at 1483. The court also held that the procedures were consistent with due process
requirements. Id. at 1485. The court evaluated the procedural due process requirements under the
Mathews v. Eldridge standard. Id. at 1483-84 (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)). Looking to the private interest, the court noted that the petitioner could only point to the
possibility of costly investigations and corrective measures. Id. Given that the majority of cases
would not involve great cost or corrective measures, the court found only a minimal private interest.
Id. Regarding the risk of an erroneous deprivation of interest, the petitioner raised two potential
issues: (1) substantive standards to guide the EPA's decisionmaking in hearings were arguably miss-
ing because the EPA had not yet developed standards for corrective action; and (2) procedural stan-
dards were lacking in relation to the EPA's role as both an investigatory and adjudicative body and
in relation to the fact that the Presiding Officer would not be able to handle intricate technical issues.
Id. at 1484-85. With regard to the first issue, the court held that the EPA had sufficient guidance,
looking to three other sources that the EPA had indicated could provide guidance until standards
were adopted. Id. at 1484. With regard to the second issue, there was no showing that those serving
as adjudicators exhibited any risk of actual bias or prejudgment or that an ALJ would be any better at
addressing the technical issues. Id. at 1484-85. Finally, in examining the government's interest, the
court considered the savings of costs that would have to be expended with full adjudicatory hearings
and an increased ability to enforce subsection (h). Id. at 1485.
176. Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2006).
See infra Part II1.B.3 for a discussion of this case.
177. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). See infra Part 1II.B.3 for discussion of the First Circuit's doctrinal
shift.
178. See discussion infra Part I11.B.3. Although the First Circuit also cited Chevron, it had
honored its Seacoast precedent for many years after Chevron was decided. However, the First Cir-
cuit had previously suggested that Seacoast's "vitality in the post-Chevron era" needed to be consid-
ered. See Citizens Awareness Network v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 348 n.4 (2004). The Citizens
Awareness court followed Seacoast, but stated that
while the type of hearing required by a statute turns [upon] congressional intent, Chevron
adds a new dimension, requiring that the agency's reasonable interpretation be accorded
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procedural provisions directly, it is a critical decision regarding a court's
use of precedent under the Chevron doctrine that affects the traditional
approaches to the interpretive issue.
In Brand X, the Supreme Court examined the relationship between
the stare decisis effect of an appellate court's statutory interpretation
precedent and the Chevron deference due to an administrative agency's
subsequent, but contrary, interpretation. 79 The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) had issued an order declaring that cable modem ser-
vice was not a "telecommunications service" under the Communications
Act.' 8 The Ninth Circuit held that the FCC could not permissibly con-
strue the Communications Act to exempt cable companies providing
Internet service from Title 1I regulation.181 Rather than analyze the per-
missibility of that construction under the deferential framework of Chev-
ron, the Ninth Circuit grounded its holding in the stare decisis effect of
its own precedent:182 in AT&T Corp. v. Portland, the court had held that
cable modem service was a "telecommunications service" under the
Communications Act. 183 The court held that its interpretation in Portland
was the correct one and vacated the FCC's order.
184
The Supreme Court disagreed. Echoing its decision in Chevron, the
Court reiterated that "[flilling [statutory] gaps ... involves difficult pol-
icy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than courts.' 85 It
held that "[a] court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion."'
' 86
deference if there is any ambiguity as to that intent. To what extent (if at all) this reality
erodes Seacoast's rationale is a question we leave for another day.
Id. See supra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of Seacoast.
179. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 979-80.
180. Id. at 978; In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Red. 4798, 4822 (2002).
181. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 979.
182. Id
183. 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000). However, an important distinction between Portland
and BrandX is that Portland was not reviewing an administrative proceeding, and the FCC was not
a party to that case. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 979-80.
184. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 979; see also Brand X Internet Servs v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1130-
32 (9th Cir. 2003).
185. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 980.
186. Id. at 982. The Court went on to state: "The better rule is to hold judicial interpretations
contained in precedents to the same demanding Chevron . . . standard that applies if the court is
reviewing the agency's construction on a blank slate." Id.
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Thus, the Court demanded that courts "reexamine pre-Chevron
precedents through a Chevron lens."' 87 Specifically, the Court reasoned
that:
A contrary rule would produce anomalous results. It would mean
that whether an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute
is entitled to Chevron deference would turn on the order in which
the interpretations issue: If the court's construction came first, its
construction would prevail, whereas if the agency's came first,
the agency's construction would command Chevron deference.
Yet whether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority
to interpret a statute does not depend on the order in which the
judicial and administrative constructions occur.' 88
Moreover, the Court reasoned, the Ninth Circuit's rule "would 'lead to
the ossification of large portions of our statutory law,' by precluding
agencies from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous stat-
utes." 189 It concluded that "[n]either Chevron nor the doctrine of stare
decisis requires these haphazard results."
'190
Justice Scalia forcefully dissented.1 91 He argued that allowing an
agency to override what a court believes to be the best interpretation of a
statute makes judicial decisions subject to reversal by executive offi-
cers. 192 Citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.193
for the proposition that "[j]udgments within the powers vested in courts
by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised,
overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Gov-
ernment," Justice Scalia protested that the majority's position was proba-
bly unconstitutional because of what it would effectively allow: "Even
when the agency itself is party to the case in which the Court construes a
187. Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2006).
188. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 983.
189. Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing)). See infra note 345 for further discussion of ossification.
190. Id. at 983.
191. See id. at 1005-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Amusingly, Justice Scalia ended his dissent on
an up note for those in this author's position, concluding: "It is indeed a wonderful new world that
the Court creates, one full of promise for administrative-law professors in need of tenure articles
and, of course, for litigators." Id. at 1019.
192. Id. at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948). In Chicago & Southern AirLines, the court of appeals held that
it had jurisdiction to review an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) awarding an overseas air
route, but it needed to avoid any conflict with the President's foreign-affairs powers. Id. The court
concluded that its review of CAB's actions would remain subject to approval or disapproval by the
President. Id.
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statute, the agency will be able to disregard that construction and seek
Chevron deference for its contrary construction the next time around."
194
The majority defended its position by countering that "the agency's
decision to construe that statute differently from a court does not say that
the court's holding was legally wrong."'' 95 Rather, "the agency may, con-
sistent with the court's holding, choose a different construction, since the
agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason)
of such statutes.1 96 In other arenas, the majority clarified, the court's
prior ruling remains binding precedent.'
1 97
3. First Circuit Redux: Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson
In Dominion Energy,198 the First Circuit was once again faced with
the issue originally addressed in Seacoast: whether a permit issuance
under the CWA requires formal procedures. 199 Citing both Chevron and
Brand X, the court announced that it was compelled to apply Chevron
deference to the EPA's interpretation rather than follow the longstanding
circuit precedent established by Seacoast twenty-eight years earlier.
Like Seacoast, Dominion Energy involved an electricity generator's
application to the EPA for a renewal of its National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit and a thermal variance authoriza-
tion under the CWA.200 After the EPA denied a thermal variance authori-
zation to Dominion Energy, the company requested an evidentiary
hearing with APA formal adjudication procedures.20'
Sections 316 and 402 of the CWA require the EPA, in issuing
NPDES permits or authorizing a thermal variance, to offer an "opportu-
nity for public hearing., 20 2 The CWA does not define "public hearing,"
but, in Seacoast, the First Circuit construed the term to mean an
194. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 983.
196. Id.
197. Id. This Article does not take a position on the validity of the majority's reasoning in
BrandX That argument is reserved for another day and another article.
198. 443 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2006).
199. Id. at 14-15; see also Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 (1st
Cir. 1978), discussed supra Part III.A.2.
200. Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 13. For thirty years, the withdrawals and discharges of
water have been authorized by a series of NPDES permits issued by the EPA pursuant to § 402(a) of
the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. Id. at 13. Thermal variance procedures outlined in the CWA are
incorporated into the NPDES permits under § 316(a), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Id. at 13.
201. Id. at 13-14.
202. Id. at 14. Whether Dominion requested an evidentiary hearing under § 402(a) or § 316(a)
of the CWA had no legal effect, nor did whether Dominion was seeking a permit renewal rather than
applying for a permit. Id. at 14 n.2.
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64 203"evidentiary hearing" in compliance with §§ 556 and 557 of the APA.
In 1979, the EPA issued regulations adopting this understanding.2 °4
In 1995, however, the EPA changed course. Citing regulatory effi-
ciency, the EPA adopted an amendment to this rule, eliminating formal
evidentiary hearings from the permit process.2 5 In doing so, the EPA
asserted that the CWA does not reflect any congressional intent to man-
date evidentiary hearings as part of NPDES permit proceedings or to
preclude informal adjudication in that context.20 6 Thus, after conducting
a risk-benefit analysis, the agency decided that its informal proceedings
satisfied the APA.2 °7 Because this new rule allowed for only a written
application process, the EPA denied Dominion Energy's request for a
formal hearing.20 8
Relying on Seacoast as precedent that bound the court to disregard
the agency's contrary interpretation, Dominion Energy challenged the
EPA's new rule in the First Circuit.20 9 The Dominion Energy court dis-
counted that reliance, reasoning that it ignored two important post-
Seacoast changes in the legal landscape: Chevron and the EPA's issu-
ance of its new rule. 210 The court then applied the rule from BrandX: if a
court has not conclusively held that the statute is clear, then the review-
ing court must defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation. 211 After
determining that Seacoast did not hold that Congress clearly intended the
term "public hearing" to mean an evidentiary hearing with formal proce-
dures,21 2 the court held that the EPA's new rule was a reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute and thus was entitled to Chevron deference.2 3
No other circuits have yet had the opportunity to face the same is-
sue as the First Circuit did in Dominion Energy. The First Circuit's shift
in Dominion Energy may be the beginning of a trend that should end
203. Id.; see also Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 878.
204. Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 15 (citing Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854,
32,938 (June 7, 1979)).
205. Id. (citing Amendments to Streamline the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem Program Regulations: Round Two, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,886, 30,900 (May 15, 2000) (to be codified




209. Id. at 16. Specifically, Dominion relied on Seacoast for the proposition that the EPA has a
"non-discretionary duty to convene an evidentiary hearing." Id. Absent Chevron and the EPA's
change in position, this argument would be particularly persuasive in light of the fact that both Sea-
coast and Dominion dealt with the same statutory provisions-§§ 316(a) and 402(a) of the CWA.
See id. at 13; Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 878.
210. Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 16.
211. Id. at 16-17.
212. Id. at 18.
213. Id. at 18-19.
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before it gains support. To understand why, a more complete discussion
of the Chevron doctrine and its underlying rationales is necessary.
IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF CHEVRON'S DOMAIN
Chevron is now considered "a ubiquitous formula governing court-
agency relations": 214 the court must first ask whether Congress clearly
addressed the precise question at issue, and, if not, the court then asks
whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable. 215 Chevron's two-step
analysis appears to offer the advantages of simplicity and efficiency over
the less predictable multi-factor approach to deference. 216 But these ad-
vantages are somewhat illusory. The implementation of the Chevron
two-step analysis has generated a substantial number of issues.21 7 While
much of the early commentary focused on Chevron's rationales and its
two steps, lately courts and commentators have focused on "step zero" of
Chevron: whether the Chevron doctrine should apply to agency interpre-
tations in particular circumstances. 218 A second, related issue that has
drawn recent attention is the question of what level of deference, if any,
should be given if a court determines that a particular agency interpreta-
tion is beyond Chevron's domain.
This Part provides an overview of these issues and examines the
application of Chevron to the interpretation of jurisdictional provisions
and judicial review provisions, the two areas of interpretation most
analogous to the interpretation of procedural provisions.
A. Determining Chevron's Domain: Chevron Step Zero
Despite its breadth, Chevron does not require judicial deference to
all agency legal interpretations. Chevron's application is limited to "an
agency's construction of the statute which it administers. '21 9 The first
major limitation for Chevron's application, therefore, is that the agency
must be interpreting a statute. Agencies interpret many legal documents
other than statutes, and in those contexts Chevron deference should not
apply.220 For example, courts do not defer to agency interpretations of the
214. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 834.
215. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
216. See Diver, supra note 143, at 592-93. See supra note 147 for a description of these
factors.
217. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 836; Sunstein, supra note 152, at 191. See
also infra note 250. Although the term "step zero" is now more common, I borrow it as originally
used by Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman in Chevron's Domain, supra note 27, at 836.
219. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
220. Most notably, agencies frequently construe their own regulations. The leading decision
concerning deference to agency regulatory construction is Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
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Constitution or court decisions.222 Agencies also should not receive
Chevron deference for their interpretations of contracts, deeds, and other
legal instruments.223
The second major limitation is that Chevron does not apply to all
federal agency interpretations of statutes; it applies only to statutes that
the agency "administers. 224 Whether the agency administers the statute
is usually not a difficult question. Agencies generally are said to adminis-
ter statutes "for which they have some special responsibility, 225 and they
therefore are usually considered to administer the substantive provisions
of the enabling statutes that they enforce.226 But for general statutes-
U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (declaring that an agency's construction of its own regulation "becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"). For a detailed
discussion of the Seminole Rock doctrine, see John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judi-
cial Deference to Agency Interpretations ofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996) (discuss-
ing in detail critical analysis of this doctrine).
221. See David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 113, 114-16, 123 (1993) (explaining that there are instances in which executive officials inevi-
tably interpret constitutional provisions but concluding that they receive no deference from review-
ing courts). The Court has, however, been willing to grant Chevron deference to an agency's inter-
pretation relating to an international convention. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y,
478 U.S. 221, 241 (1986) (granting Chevron deference to Secretary of Commerce's determination
that it better served legislation implementing the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling to accept Japan's offer of an agreement to phase out whaling, rather than to certify Japan's
whaling activities to the President for possible sanctions).
222. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 n.5 (2000).
223. See LAWSON, supra note 34, at 458-59. Although Chevron deference should not extend to
these instruments, e.g., Meadow Green-Wildcat Corp. v. Hathaway, 936 F.2d 601, 605 (1st Cir.
1991) (holding that the Forest Service's interpretation should not receive deference because permits
should be treated like contracts), some courts have nevertheless granted deference in such contexts,
e.g., Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 900 F.2d 340, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's interpretation of gas supply contracts should receive
Chevron deference).
224. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
225. LAWSON, supra note 34, at 459. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (addressing the meaning of "administer" and holding that the EPA was entitled to Chev-
ron deference because the President has delegated his statutory authority to the EPA); Am. Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 46 F.3d 73, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply
deference to FLRA's interpretation of a statute that it was not charged with administering). See also
Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90
MiNN. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2006) (noting that the Internal Revenue Service has a special responsi-
bility with respect to tax laws). A problem can arise when multiple agencies share enforcement
responsibility for administering a statute. See, e.g., Rapaport v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 59 F.3d
212, 216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that Chevron does not apply and that the court should pro-
ceed de novo on statutory interpretation questions when more than one agency administers the
statute).
226. There are several exceptions to this principle. The first exception is that Chevron does not
apply in the criminal context. Courts generally do not grant deference to the Department of Justice's
interpretation of federal criminal statutes despite that agency's special responsibility for the en-
forcement of those statutes. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that criminal statutes are administered by courts, not agencies, because even
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like the APA, which are applicable to all agencies-no agency is consid-
ered to bear any special responsibility worthy of deference.227
The primary reason that courts refuse to extend Chevron deference
in these contexts relates to one of Chevron's primary rationales: implied
delegation. 228 Courts appear to view these contexts as areas where Con-
gress has failed to delegate interpretive authority to the agency.229 A sec-
ondary reason for declining deference in these contexts is grounded in
concerns about institutional competency and separation of powers and
focuses on the greater accountability, and policymaking expertise of
though "[t]he Justice Department, of course, has a very specific responsibility to determine for itself
what this statute means . . . we have never thought that the interpretation of those charged with
prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference"); United States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595, 599 n.2
(11 th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he polices and procedures of the United States Department of Justice and its
interpretation of statutes are not binding upon the judicial branch of our Govemment."). See also
Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It's a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (1996) (defending
the refusal to extend Chevron deference to the interpretations of criminal statutes by the Justice
Department because deference is only warranted when Congress has delegated administrative au-
thority, and the Justice Department's role under a criminal statute is purely executive). But see Dan
M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 489-92 (1996)
(urging courts to apply Chevron deference to the Justice Department's interpretations of criminal
statutes).
The second type of exception is that Chevron does not apply when the statutory provision at issue
does not directly implicate the agency's regulatory mission. See, e.g., Wagner Seed, 946 F.2d at 920
(holding that the agency did not "administer" a statute and therefore refusing to apply Chevron).
The third type of exception can arise when multiple agencies share enforcement responsibility for
administering a statute. Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in
Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1517 (2000) (recognizing this exception but
arguing that a proponent of the common law metaphor might support granting Chevron deference in
this context); Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: Interagency Conflicts, 43
ALA. L. REV. 35, 73 (1991) (noting that, "[i]n many instances where administrative authority is
divided between two or more agencies, no single agency's authority is necessarily superior. Courts
have been unable to apply the deference rule in these situations"). See, e.g., Rapaport, 59 F.3d at
216-17 (holding that Chevron does not apply and that the court should proceed de novo on statutory
interpretation questions when more than one agency administers the statute).
227. Noah, supra note 226, at 1517. See, e.g., Soc. Sec. Admin., Baltimore, Md. v. FLRA, 201
F.3d 465, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (refusing to defer to the agency's interpretation of a general statute
because it was "not committed to the Authority's administration"); Air N. Am. v. Dep't of Transp.,
937 F.2d 1427, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Congress had not directed the Department of
Transportation to implement the APA and that, furthermore, delegation to administrative agencies
would be nonsensical because the APA is meant to constrain agencies). Nor do agencies receive
deference when interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (2006)), which applies to all fed-
eral agencies. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. West, 31 F. Supp. 2d 714, 721 (D. Alaska 1998) (holding
that the Army Corps of Engineers' interpretation of NEPA was not entitled to Chevron deference).
228. Noah, supra note 226, at 1518. See also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpreta-
tions Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 25, 32-35 (1990) (examining the
distinction between explicit and implicit delegations of interpretive authority).
229. See Noah, supra note 226, at 1518-19.
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agencies over courts.2 30 Where policymaking expertise or accountability
are not significant to the interpretive issue, it is less likely that Congress
implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the agency. As discussed
below, these reasons similarly support refusing to extend Chevron defer-
ence to agency interpretations of jurisdictional provisions, judicial
review provisions, and procedural provisions.
B. Deference Beyond Chevron's Domain: Skidmore "Respect"
If a court determines that Chevron does not apply because of a fail-
ure at step zero, the next question is what level of deference, if any, is
available to an agency interpretation. The Supreme Court began to an-
swer this question in 2000 through a series of decisions discussed be-
low. 231 Since that time, the Court has restricted Chevron's reach and enti-
tled the agency to "respect" only where the agency interpretation has
"the power to persuade. 232 In doing so, the Court breathed life back into
the pre-Chevron multi-factor discretionary approach to deference articu-
lated in its 1944 decision, Skidmore v. Swifi. 233 Skidmore "respect" is
now considered to be an intermediate deference standard that replaces
the dichotomy between Chevron deference and no deference.234
Skidmore v. Swift involved the Department of Labor's interpretation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act through an interpretive bulletin and
230. See id. at 1518-19 & n.173; Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991) (stating that "familiarity and policymaking expertise account in the first
instance for the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the agency
rather than to the reviewing court").
231. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that Skidmore,
not Chevron, governed the level of deference for an agency interpretation in an opinion letter);
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001) (holding that Skidmore, not Chevron,
governed the level of deference for an agency interpretation in a tariff classification ruling letter);
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 915-16 (2006) (holding that neither Chevron nor Skidmore
applied to the Attorney General's interpretation of a portion of the statute for which the Attorney
General had no special responsibility).
232. Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
233. See id.
234. See Hickman, supra note 225, at 1552 n.68 (2006) (highlighting the fact that "some schol-
ars use the term 'Skidmore respect' rather than 'Skidmore deference' in distinguishing the Skidmore
approach from Chevron deference and tracking the language used by the Mead Court in its decision).
See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 198
n.80 (2004) (referring to the term "Skidmore deference" as an oxymoron because "the court never
technically defers to the agency position under Skidmore even if the court ultimately adopts the
position; the agency position is mere evidence considered by the court in its attempt to determine the
single best interpretation"); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the
Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1127, 1132-33 (2001) (alternately using
the terms "Skidmore deference" and "Skidmore respect"). But see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27,
at 836 (suggesting that Skidmore is better regarded as a deference doctrine). Thorough consideration
of whether Skidmore's standard is a true deference doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. For
purposes of clarity, I refer to the Skidmore standard as "deference."
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informal rulings.235 The Court noted that there was no statutory provision
as to what deference, if any, the Court should give to the agency's inter-
pretations in these forms and that the interpretation was not reached as a
result of a formal adjudicatory hearing.236 But, the Court stated, the
agency's "policies are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon
more specialized experience and broader investigations and information
than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case. 237 Accordingly, the
Court declared that the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of the
agency under the statute, "while not controlling upon the courts by rea-
son of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guid-
ance." 238 The Court identified the following factors as relevant to deter-
mining the appropriate level of deference: "the thoroughness evident in
[the judgment's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control., 239 These factors
were among the factors used by courts in the pre-Chevron world.24 °
While most judges (particularly Justice Scalia)24' and commentators
thought Skidmore had died a quiet death with the advent of the Chevron
era, the Court revived its sliding scale of deference-including no defer-
ence-in the recent cases of Christensen v. Harris County242 and United
States v. Mead Corp.24 3 Together, these cases articulated a dual system of
deference: although certain agency interpretations do not warrant manda-
tory deference under Chevron, they may receive some level of deference
depending on their "power to persuade" the court.244
235. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137-38.
236. Id. at 139.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 140.
239. Id.
240. For a description of other factors, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
241. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia argued that "Skidmore deference to authoritative
agency views is an anachronism, dating from an era in which we declined to give agency interpreta-
tions ... authoritative effect.... That era came to an end with our watershed decision in Chevron."
Id. In United States v. Mead Corp., Justice Scalia dissented with even harsher words:
Skidmore deference is a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation. To
condemn a vast body of agency action to that regime (all except rulemaking, formal (and
informal?) adjudication, and whatever else might now and then be included within to-
day's intentionally vague formulation of affirmative congressional intent to "delegate") is
irresponsible.
533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
242. 529 U.S. 576.
243. 533 U.S. 218.
244. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 858 (stating that a second doctrine is needed
because Chevron is "confined to situations in which an agency is exercising delegated power to bind
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In Mead, the Court articulated a test that is now commonly known
as the "force of law" test: to qualify for Chevron deference-in other
words, to make it past step zero-Congress must intend to delegate au-
thority to the agency to interpret the statute with "the force of law," and
the agency's interpretation has been issued pursuant to that authority.245
The Court held that the Customs Department's tariff classification rul-
ings were best treated like "interpretations contained in policy state-
ments, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines," which lie beyond
Chevron's domain.246
In early 2006, the Court built on this precedent when it held that
some agency interpretations are not even entitled to Skidmore deference.
In Gonzales v. Oregon, the well-publicized case about the use of medical
marijuana in Oregon, the Court held that the Attorney General's interpre-
tation of the federal Controlled Substances Act did not have the force of
law.24 7 Moreover, the Court held that the Attorney General's interpreta-
tion was not eligible for even Skidmore deference because he was inter-
preting a part of the statute that he did not administer. 248 Accordingly, the
Court afforded no deference at all to the Attorney General's interpreta-
tion and invalidated the interpretive rule that made dispensing marijuana
for medical purposes in Oregon a federal crime.249 The Court has thus
carved out another type of issue that fails at Chevron's step zero.
persons with the force of law"). Skidmore deference operates on a sliding scale ranging from a high
level of deference, equivalent to that under Chevron, to no deference. Id See also Ronald J. Kro-
toszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy
of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 739 (2002); Richard W. Murphy, A "New" Counter-Marbury:
Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 42-49
(2004) (crafting a framework by which Skidmore deference can be appropriately applied). A number
of commentators have written about these cases, in particular Mead. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bress-
man, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005);
Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 297 (2004); Wil-
liam S. Jordan, IIl, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory Itterpretations: The Answer is Chevron
Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719 (2002); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial
Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013 (2005); Adrian Ver-
meule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003); Russell L. Weaver,
The Emperor Has No Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 175 (2002); Torrey A. Cope, Note, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Jurisdic-
tion After Mead, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327 (2005). As with the Chevron doctrine, this Article does not
claim to take a position about Mead; it takes Mead as an accepted (albeit developing) part of the
doctrine.
245. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
246. Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
247. 546 U.S. 243, 126 S. Ct. 904, 922 (2006).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 925.
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C. Issues on the Fringes of Chevron's Domain: Pushing the Boundaries
A number of issues lie on the fringes of Chevron's domain because
Supreme Court guidance is lacking. Gonzales and similar cases demon-
strate that certain issues are not appropriate for Chevron deference and
should instead receive Skidmore deference or no deference at all. While
scholars have admirably attempted to resolve some of these issues,
2 50
none have comprehensively addressed whether Chevron should apply to
agency interpretations of the procedural provisions contained in their
enabling statutes, particularly those provisions relating to the level of
formality required for adjudication. The two areas most analogous to the
interpretation of procedural provisions are the interpretation of jurisdic-
tional provisions and the interpretation of judicial review provisions. To
the extent courts have addressed questions surrounding these interpreta-
tions, most courts and commentators agree that Chevron deference is not
appropriate.
1. Jurisdictional Provisions
The Court has not reached a consensus on whether Chevron applies
to jurisdictional disputes.2 5 1 For example, in Gonzales v. Oregon, the
Court refused to defer to an agency's expansive definition of its own ju-
risdiction under an enabling statute.252 Yet, in a few other decisions, the
Court has extended Chevron deference to agency interpretations that nar-
rowed the reach of the agency's jurisdiction. 253 As a result, this question
remains unsettled in the lower courts. 4
250. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 849-52 (addressing fourteen issues, in-
cluding jurisdiction and procedural rules, which remain unresolved); Sunstein, supra note 152, at
222-28 (addressing numerous step-zero issues); Stanley, supra note 32, at 1093 (concluding that
Skidmore deference should apply to agency interpretations of procedural provisions in the absence of
"on the record" language); Noah, supra note 226, at 1516-29 (addressing jurisdictional issues).
251. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 845-46; Sunstein, supra note 152, at 236;
Noah, supra note 226, at 1519-21. See also, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S.
354, 380-81 (1988) (dividing on the issue); Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 925 (refusing to defer to De-
partment of Justice's interpretation of its jurisdiction). Cf FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133-39 (2000) (addressing the jurisdictional issue indirectly through Chevron
step one and holding that the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act prohibited the FDA from regulating
tobacco and nicotine products). The Court may have an opportunity to rule on the jurisdictional issue
in the 2006-2007 term in Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.
Ct. 2960 (June 26, 2006) (challenge by states and environmental groups to the EPA's denial of a
petition for rulemaking to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases). As of publication, no
decision had been issued.
252. 126 S. Ct. at 925. See also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) (refusing to grant Chevron deference to Army Corp of Engi-
neers' interpretation of the CWA § 404).
253. See Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 452 (1999) (defer-
ring to the agency's position that it did not have "jurisdiction to review a fiscal intermediary's re-
fusal to reopen a reimbursement determination"); Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993) (grant-
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Courts refusing to defer in this context find support in the theory of
implied delegation on which Chevron rests-that Congress could not
have intended to delegate to agencies the power to determine the scope
of their own authority.255 They reason that independent federal courts,
not the agencies themselves, should answer that question. 256 In Missis-
sippi Power & Light, Justice Brennan articulated the argument that inde-
pendent federal courts should be the ones to address the scope of agency
authority and urged that judgments about jurisdiction "have not been en-
trusted to the agency" by Congress and might well "conflict... with the
agency's institutional interests in expanding its own power., 257 In his
view, Congress cannot be presumed to ask "an agency to fill 'gaps' in a
statute confining the agency's jurisdiction. 258
Moreover, agencies do not possess special expertise in interpreting
their jurisdictional limits. 259 In contrast, courts do have expertise in juris-
dictional matters. 260  When formulating procedural laws, Congress rec-
ognizes this expertise and trusts the judgment of courts to interpret these
laws and make necessary procedural decisions. 261 A similar trust in the
ing Chevron deference to the ICC's determination that it did not have jurisdiction to award repara-
tions); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116-19 (1989) (deferring to an agency interpretation
denying the extension of ERISA to claims for vacation benefits). See also Sunstein, supra note 152,
at 235-36 (arguing that an exemption for deference with regards to jurisdictional questions is vul-
nerable to criticism and that deference in this context is supported by Chevron's rationales).
254. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (lst Cir. 1996) (explaining that "it is
unclear whether deference is appropriate" when the question is whether there is rulemaking authority
at all); Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1995) (deferring on a jurisdictional issue
involving the definition of "public lands"); Cavert Acquisition Co. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 598, 610 (3d
Cir. 1996) (deferring on a jurisdictional issue involving the definition of "employee").
255. See, e.g., NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2004) (refusing to defer and
stating that "it seems highly unlikely that a responsible Congress would implicitly delegate to an
agency the power to define the scope of its own power") (citation omitted).
256. See Sunstein, supra note 152, at 235 (acknowledging this argument but arguing instead
for Chevron deference to agency interpretations ofjurisdictional questions). See Merrill & Hickman,
supra note 27, at 912-14 (arguing for the application of Skidmore deference to jurisdictional ques-
tions when Congress would want the issue of scope of agency authority to be resolved as a matter of
common law deference).
257. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 387 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
258. Id. See also Sunstein, supra note 152, at 235.
259. Sunstein, supra note 152, at 235.
260. See Noah, supra note 226, at 1522-29 (describing the expertise of courts with regard to
jurisdiction as a reason why courts are better suited than agencies to determine jurisdictional matters
and noting, as an example, that courts must routinely determine subject matter jurisdiction).
261. See id. (relating to subject matter jurisdiction determinations). See also Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735,
831-33 (2001) (analyzing the congressional and judicial powers with regard to procedural law);
Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy,
and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 30:541
courts' jurisdictional expertise when applied to the scope of agency ju-
risdiction is entirely reasonable. Accordingly, the judiciary should be the
institution that makes these determinations.
The most problematic concern raised by agencies determining the
limits of their own jurisdiction is one of self-interest. When given the
opportunity, agencies tend to expand their jurisdiction beyond statutory
limits. 262 Broader jurisdiction results in more power to regulate, and
power is something that most agencies would like to have.263 Thus, agen-
cies seeking to expand their jurisdiction may not be acting in the best
interest of the public, thereby rendering the agency's interpretation of its
jurisdictional limits suspect.
The argument that jurisdictional questions lie beyond Chevron's
domain, however, has two significant challenges. The first challenge is
that the line between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions is
sometimes blurry.264 Indeed, Justice Scalia has argued that "there is no
1291, 1356-58 (1986) (examining the relationship between statutory and procedural common law
making).
262. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 917-20 (2006) (holding that the Controlled
Substances Act granted the Attorney General "limited powers, to be exercised in specific ways," and
that the "authority desired by the Government is inconsistent with the design of the statute"); FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133-39 (2000) (holding that the Federal Drug
and Cosmetic Act prohibited the FDA from regulating tobacco and nicotine products). Cf Noah,
supra note 226, at 1517-18 (noting that the rationale for no deference in the criminal context recog-
nizes the incentives for prosecutorial agencies to interpret criminal statutes expansively).
263. While agencies are "often prepared to accept less money with greater control than money
with less control," the "turf' issue of agency jurisdiction may be more complicated. JAMES Q.
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 179 (1989)
(quoting MORTON H. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 51 (1974)). Pro-
fessor James Q. Wilson has argued that although agencies give high priority to turf, the statement
that agencies always want to maximize their power is an oversimplification because, among other
things, agency executives seek autonomy and bigger budgets, and broader jurisdiction may be ac-
companied by more complex tasks for which the agency is accountable, more rivals, and more con-
straints. Id. at 179-217. For example, an agency might use limited jurisdiction as a shield to avoid a
hot-button political issue. Id. at 191-92 (noting that in trying to maximize autonomy, agencies want
to avoid tasks that produce divided or hostile constituencies and tasks that may have a high political
cost). See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct.
2960 (June 26, 2006) (EPA arguing that it does not have the statutory authority to regulate carbon
dioxide under the Clean Air Act). See also James O'Reilly, Jurisdiction to Decide an Agency's Own
Jurisdiction: The Forgotten Take of the Hynson Quartet, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 829 (2006).
264. Sunstein, supra note 152, at 235. See also Noah, supra note 226, at 1520 n.179. See, e.g.,
Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 54-55 (1990) (White, J., dissenting); Miss. Power &
Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 381-82 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) (Williams, J., dissent-
ing) ("Indeed, any issue may readily be characterized as jurisdictional merely by manipulating the
level of generality at which it is framed.... Such pliable labels should not control the scope of re-
view."); Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying Chev-
ron deference after discussion about jurisdictional issue); Air Courier Conference of Am./Int'l
Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1223-25 (3d Cir. 1992) (granting Chevron deference
after discussing petitioner's argument that deference was inappropriate in light of the Postal Ser-
2007] Agency Interpretations of Procedural Provisions
discernible line between an agency's exceeding its authority and an
agency's exceeding authorized application of its authority. 265 The sec-
ond challenge asserts that Chevron's implied delegation rationale actu-
ally supports its application to jurisdictional questions because when
agencies assert or deny jurisdiction over an issue, "it is either because
democratic forces are leading it to do so or because its own specialized
competence justifies its jurisdictional decision." 266 For instance, Justice
Scalia has maintained, "Congress would naturally expect that the agency
would be responsible, within broad limits, for resolving ambiguities in its
statutory authority or jurisdiction., 26
7
Like the courts, scholars disagree on whether Chevron should apply
to jurisdictional issues. Professor Cass Sunstein, formerly in favor of de-
nying deference for jurisdictional issues, now agrees with Justice
Scalia,268 while other scholars, most notably Professor Thomas Merrill,
disagree and support denying deference-at least Chevron deference-
for jurisdictional questions. 269 Interestingly, Professor Lars Noah has
noted that the asymmetry of the Supreme Court's approach suggests that
the Court is concerned with the undue expansion of agency powers. 70
This theory conforms to the implicit delegation rationale of Chevron: it is
implausible that Congress would have given agencies free reign to ex-
pand the scope of their powers. 27 1 Most courts and commentators who
vice's self-interest in jurisdictional matter); Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to
Agency Interpretations that Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957,
968-83 (1994) (arguing in favor of Chevron deference on jurisdictional questions).
265. Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
266. Sunstein, supra note 152, at 235.
267. Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 381-82 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (cited in
Sunstein, supra note 152, at 235). Justice Scalia is a well known proponent for broad application of
Chevron. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239-40 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Chevron deference should apply to interpretive rules). But see Nat'l Cable & Tele-
comm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1017-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Chevron deference is inappropriate when the agency is effectively overruling circuit court prece-
dent).
268. Compare Sunstein, supra note 26, at 2097-101 (arguing against deference on jurisdic-
tional issues), with Sunstein, supra note 152, at 234-36 (discussing why arguments exempting juris-
dictional issues from deference are vulnerable). See also Noah, supra note 226, at 1519-20, 1526
(noting Professor Sunstein's shift in positions).
269. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 912 (arguing for Skidmore deference on jurisdic-
tional questions). See also Noah, supra note 226, at 1528.
270. Noah, supra note 226, at 1521.
271. Id. at 1522 n. 184. See Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Dele-
gations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1011 (1999) ("It is presumptively unlikely that Congress in-
tended to allow an agency to decide for itself whether an area of regulation is within its regulatory
jurisdiction where the enabling legislation is silent on that authority."). See also FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (refusing to grant deference to FDA's asser-
tion of jurisdiction over tobacco products because "it is plain that Congress has not given the FDA
the authority that it seeks to exercise").
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support not extending Chevron deference to agencies' interpretations of
their own jurisdictional limits agree with this argument-Congress sim-
ply could not have intended to delegate this issue. A consensus is lack-
ing, however, on the issue of whether any deference is warranted or
272whether de novo review is preferred in this context.
2. Judicial Review Provisions
Another questionable area for the application of Chevron deference
involves the interpretation of provisions relating to judicial review. Two
types of provisions come to mind: provisions establishing judicial review
and provisions relating to the scope of review. Neither type has been ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court; however, the D.C. Circuit has refused to
apply Chevron deference to agency interpretations of statutory provisions
that establish the right of judicial review, reasoning that the agency has
no expertise in this field.273 Given this rationale, it would be very surpris-
ing if courts decided to grant Chevron deference to agency interpreta-
tions of scope of review provisions because agencies similarly lack
expertise in this field.
As with jurisdictional issues, the primary argument against defer-
ence for interpretations of judicial review provisions is the lack of im-
plied delegation. According to this argument, Congress could not have
intended to delegate to agencies the power to tell the court whether judi-
274cial review is available or what is the proper scope of that review.
Because Congress usually relies on courts to determine these issues, this
is a persuasive rationale.
The expertise rationale similarly fails to support granting deference
to agencies in this context. Agencies are not experts on issues of judicial
review; courts are. Moreover, issues of judicial review are not "gaps" in
the statute that agencies should be filling. Judicial review provisions
do not involve policymaking; they are "pure" issues of statutory
272. See, e.g., supra notes 251-256.
273. See Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 478-80
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that Chevron does not apply to the provisions of a statute establishing
rights of judicial review). See also Ramey v. Bowsher, 9 F.3d 133, 136 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Inter-
preting statutes granting jurisdiction to Article III courts is exclusively the province of the courts.");
Reeb v. Econ. Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 926 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The courts... have to
make their own determination whether the district court has jurisdiction, rather than defer to the
[agency] in the first instance.").
274. See Murphy Exploration, 252 F.3d at 478-80; see also LAWSON, supra note 34, at 456
(suggesting that most would agree that courts would not give deference to agency interpretations of
provisions relating to the judicial review in their enabling acts).
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275construction. For example, courts consistently refuse to grant defer-
276ence to agency interpretations of the effective date of a statute.
Finally, concerns about agency self-interest counsel against defer-
ence. Agencies may be inclined to limit the availability of judicial review
so that fewer agency actions could be reviewed. Likewise, agencies may
be inclined to interpret a scope of review provision narrowly to allow for
heightened deference. Such actions could raise separation of powers
problems: an agency's ability to obstruct judicial review of its interpreta-
tions would be both an aggrandizement of its own authority and an en-
croachment on the power of the judicial branch.
Thus, these arguments weigh heavily against granting any type of
deference to agency interpretations of judicial review provisions, even
more so than with jurisdictional issues. Although there are fewer cases
relating to judicial review provisions,277 the analogies drawn in this Part
provide strong arguments for denying deference in contexts where Chev-
ron's underlying rationales are lacking and where agencies are likely to
act in their own self-interest rather than in the public's interest. These
arguments are even more powerful in the context of adjudicatory proce-
dural provisions, where individual substantive rights are at stake.
275. See Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Fernandez-Vargas v.
Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422 (2006) ("Chevron appears to speak to statutory interpretation in those
instances where Congress delegated rule-making power to an agency and thereby sought to rely on
agency expertise in the formulation of substantive policy.").
276. See, e.g., Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d 666, 675 n.10 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[d]etermining
a statute's temporal reach ... does not require agency expertise but, rather, presents a pure question
of statutory interpretation for the courts to decide") (quotations and citation omitted); Jurado-
Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the determination ofa stat-
ute's temporal reach does not involve any "special agency expertise," and therefore determining the
retroactivity of the statute "without affording any deference to the Attorney General"); Sandoval v.
Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 1999) (avoiding the Chevron issue but questioning whether Chev-
ron deference is appropriate in determining a statute's effective date because "issue[s] concerning a
statute's effective date [do not] implicate[] agency expertise in a meaningful way"); Goncalves v.
Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 127 (1st Cir. 1998) ("We think it is a significant question whether the determi-
nation of the application of the effective date of a governing statute is the sort of policy matter which
Congress intended the agency to decide and thus whether the doctrinal underpinnings of Chevron are
present here."). See also INS. v. St. Cyr, 533. U.S. 289, 320 n.45 (2001) The Court stated, in re-
sponse to the agency's argument that the Court should defer to the agency's interpretation regarding
the retroactivity of the statute:
We only defer, however, to agency interpretations of statutes that, applying the normal
"tools of statutory constructions" are ambiguous. Because a statute that is ambiguous
with respect to retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be unambigu-
ously prospective, there is, for Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an
agency to resolve.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
277. The dearth of cases in this area may support the notion that agencies understand that they
will not receive deference on their interpretations of judicial review provisions and thus do not at-
tempt to interpret these provisions, or at least do not seek deference for such interpretations.
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V. THE ARGUMENT FOR DE Novo,
NOT DEFERENTIAL, JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether deference
should be granted to agency interpretations of procedural provisions in
enabling statutes. 278 Consequently, as discussed above, courts have fol-
lowed three different approaches in answering this question. This Part
advocates for a fourth approach, which is more appropriate than those
currently used by the courts.
First, drawing on concerns identified in the context of interpreting
jurisdictional and judicial review provisions, this Part argues against
Chevron279 because mandatory deference is inappropriate for agency in-
terpretations of enabling act procedural provisions. These concerns-
implied delegation, expertise, self-interest and fairness-strongly indi-
cate that courts, rather than agencies, should be the primary interpreters
of procedural provisions. Second, this Part argues that, in the absence of
legislative change, a nondeferential contextual approach to the interpreta-
tion of procedural provisions in enabling acts is more appropriate than a
presumptive approach. It then proposes an analytical framework for this
approach based on factors related to the goals served by procedural
formalities.
A. Against Chevron
The first question that must be resolved is that of deference.
Agency interpretations of their statutory procedural provisions should not
be given Chevron deference for four reasons. First, Chevron's implied
delegation rationale does not fit in the procedural context. Second, inter-
preting procedural provisions is within the expertise of courts, not
278. In Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002), the Court commented on, but did
not resolve, this issue. Edleman involved a federal employment discrimination claim, which requires
that a plaintiff file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) "a charge ...
within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred" and
verify the charges. Id. at Ill & n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)(1) (1994)). Defendant
Lynchburg College challenged Edelman's failure to verify the charges he filed with the EEOC
within the time limit, arguing that his claim was therefore barred. Id at 110-11. However, an EEOC
regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1997), expressly interpreted the statute to permit verification
after the initial filing. Id. at 110 & n.2. In response to the defendant's challenge to the regulation, the
Court upheld the regulation without deciding whether the regulation was entitled to Chevron defer-
ence. Id. at 114. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment but noted that
she would have applied Chevron deference to the EEOC's procedural regulation because Congress
explicitly delegated to the EEOC the authority to make procedural rules. Id. at 122-23 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations omitted).
279. The title of Part V.A, below, is borrowed from William R. Andersen, Against Chevron-A
Modest Proposal, supra note 146.
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agencies. Third, agency self-interest and accompanying concerns about
discretion and accountability weigh heavily against deference. Fourth,
fundamental fairness concerns favor courts over agencies as the guardi-
ans of procedural protections.
1. Implied Delegation
The rationales underlying Chevron simply do not suit the context of
interpreting procedural provisions. The primary rationale articulated in
Chevron is that Congress has implicitly delegated to the agency the au-
thority to fill "gaps" in the statutory scheme.2 s°
A comparison of the interpretation of procedural provisions to the
interpretation of provisions related to agency jurisdiction and judicial
review illustrates why the implied delegation rationale is lacking in these
contexts. In each of these areas, it is hard to believe that Congress in-
tended to convey authority to the agency to interpret these provisions
with Chevron deference. While in the jurisdictional area the question is
closer as to whether Congress would intend to delegate authority to the
agency to address such issues, 281 issues relating to judicial review are
highly unlikely to be subjects of delegation. For instance, courts do not
defer to agency determinations that Congress has delegated to that
agency the authority to act with the force of law through either rulemak-
ing or adjudications.282 Likewise, "it has never been maintained that
Congress would want courts to give Chevron deference to an agency's
determination that it is entitled to Chevron deference, or should give
Chevron deference to an agency's determination of what types of
280. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). In
Chevron, the Court reasoned:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on
a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substi-
tute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by
the administrator of an agency.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 870.
281. See supra Part IV.C. See also Sunstein, supra note 152, at 242 (discussing FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), and rejecting the argument that Congress would not
delegate issues of great "economic and political significance" to agencies).
282. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 910-11 & n.378 (citing Soc. See. Bd. v.
Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946)) ("[An] agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory
power. That is a judicial function."); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 616
(1944) ("The determination of the extent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not
left for the decision of him in whom authority is vested."); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 224 (1990) ("A cardinal principle of
American constitutionalism is that those who are limited by law should not be empowered to decide
on the meaning of the limitation: foxes should not guard henhouses.").
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interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference. 283 In these contexts,
courts assume that they must first determine whether power has been
delegated to an agency before they can be compelled to defer to the
agency's exercise of that power.284 Similarly, Chevron deference should
not apply to the question of whether an agency action will be reviewed
on the record.285
A key reason underlying the hesitance to defer to agencies on these
issues reflects the view that Congress could not have intended to delegate
the power to agencies to answer these questions because of the concern
that agencies will tend to interpret them according to their own self-
interest.286 While this concern is discussed in more detail below, it is in-
tertwined with the concept of implied delegation because, given the
"feast or famine" nature of the APA's procedural packages,287 agencies
will almost always favor informal procedures over formal procedures.
288
Two other key reasons to treat this issue as outside of the scope of dele-
gated power and reject the presumption that Congress has assigned pri-
mary interpretive authority to agencies in this context-institutional
competence and fundamental fairness-are also addressed below.
283. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 910-11.
284. Id. at 910-11. Professors Merrill and Hickman note that the scope-of-jurisdiction question
arguably "does not concem whether Congress has given the agency the power to act with the force
of law, but rather how far that power extends, in the sense of what subject matter is covered." Id. at
911 n.379. Accordingly, they reason, "[t]his is more closely analogous to the question of whether a
delegation of power has been cabined by an 'intelligible principle,' something the Court has found
notoriously hard to enforce. However, even in its most lenient interpretations of the intelligible prin-
ciple, the Court has exercised independent judgment." Id. While the intelligible principle standard
"may not be very constraining," Professors Merrill and Hickman argue, "there is no doubt that the
question whether this standard is satisfied is one the court must decide independently, rather than by
deferring to the agency." Id.
285. See Funk, supra note 18, at 896-97 & n.107 (asserting that "[t]he nature of judicial review
of an agency action is solely a matter for courts to decide").
286. See supra notes 262-263.
287. See supra Part II.A.
288. Seacoast, West Chicago, Chemical Waste, and Dominion Energy are evidence that agen-
cies will normally choose informal adjudicatory procedures over formal procedures. See supra Part
111. Just as the cumbersomeness of modem informal rulemaking has led agencies to promulgate more
rules, policies, and guidance documents that are exempt from informal rulemaking procedures, we
can expect more agencies to follow the EPA's lead in Dominion Energy and reduce the procedures
available to individuals appearing before the agency despite longstanding agency practice to the
contrary for adjudications. See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 484-85, 487 (discussing informal
rulemaking trends); Morrison, supra note 35, at 90-96 (outlining the significant procedural require-
ments on agencies conducting informal rulemakings); Rakoff, supra note 18, at 163-80 (discussing
the growing tendency of agencies to use informal procedures). The movement away from formal
rulemaking to informal rulemakings has similar parallels. See supra note 59.
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2. Institutional Competence
The implied delegation rationale is related to a second rationale for
Chevron deference: the agency's expertise and comparative advantages
over the court. 289 A corollary to Chevron's implied delegation rationale is
that agencies are the most appropriate source to resolve interpretive dis-
putes that "involve[] reconciling conflicting policies. '90
The interpretation of procedural provisions should not be consid-
ered policymaking because it generally does not involve reconciling con-
flicting policies. Of course, agency experience might be relevant on some
questions of cost, such as the volume of cases handled and the possibility
of using procedural shortcuts to provide a party with substantial process
but at less expense than full formal procedures, thus making the level of
procedures a question related to policy. But statutory ambiguity in pro-
cedural provisions should not convert the issue of what procedures are
required into a policy decision for the agency. 291 Applying Chevron in
this context would actually open up the interpretive process to political
influence, rendering legislative drafting less important and inviting the
potential for agency abuse of discretion. 92
For example, in Dominion Energy, the EPA cited efficiency as its
reason for changing from its longstanding use of formal adjudicatory
procedures to informal procedures under a provision of the CWA. 293 Al-
though in policymaking, efficiency is an appropriate consideration for
agencies, it should not be an appropriate consideration for agency inter-
pretations of procedural provisions. Efficiency may be relevant to
choices about procedure in the sense that from an efficiency viewpoint,
procedure is an attempt to maximize the sum of benefits over costs, that
is, to minimize the sum of error costs and decision costs. But the choice
289. See Molot, supra note 26, at 72 (discussing Chevron and the Court's defense of its treat-
ment of ambiguity "by pointing to administrators' comparative advantages over judges in filling
statutory gaps"); Herz, supra note 244, at 366 ("It is part of the Chevron insistence that agencies
have a comparative advantage over courts in filling in gaps (i.e., in policymaking) because of their
accountability."). But see Krotoszynski, supra note 244, at 736-37 (referring to implied delegation
and agency expertise as two separate doctrines).
290. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
291. See Molot, supra note 26, at 74-75.
292. Id. at 74. For instance, a minority party could try to insert this procedural ambiguity in the
legislative process to enable an "unauthorized" rewriting of procedure should the party later gain
control of an agency's administration.
293. Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing
Amendments to Streamline the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program Regula-
tions: Round Two, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,886-01, 30,888 (May 15, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
122)).
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about whether formal adjudicatory procedures are required is one that
Congress should make in the first instance, not the agency. 9
Although court interpretations lack the flexibility of agency inter-
pretations, such flexibility is not essential when interpreting procedural
provisions. In policymaking, flexibility is viewed as a positive attribute
because agencies can adapt to changed circumstances. 295 Under Chevron
deference, courts have allowed agencies to change their interpretations so
long as the agency provides adequate reasons for their change in pol-
icy.296 Like jurisdictional provisions and especially with judicial review
provisions, however, interpretations of procedural provisions generally
should not change over time without legislative action. Congressional
intent with respect to these provisions does not change, so the only
explanation for change is a revision in policy.
Accordingly, interpretations of procedural provisions do not require
the exercise of agency discretion in response to changed factual circum-
stances, or a change in administrations. 297 Although procedures may be
viewed as another good that some administrations want to supply more
of while others provide less, without congressional action the interpreta-
tion of procedural provisions should not serve as a vehicle for this type
of political decision.298 While procedural protections may vary on a stat-
ute-by-statute basis, they should not vary in response to political change.
Furthermore, courts have important institutional advantages over
agencies when construing statutes. For instance, because federal judges
enjoy life tenure and salary guarantees, they are substantially insulated
from politics and are thus generally able to avoid the pitfalls of self-
interested behavior that agency officials may exhibit.
299
294. Because the APA lacks a set of procedures for informal adjudications, where formal pro-
cedures are not required the agency is free to take efficiency into account in tailoring informal adju-
dications to individual cases, so long as all other statutory and constitutional requirements are met.
295. See Sunstein, supra note 152, at 246 (noting that "this flexibility is a primary benefit of
Chevron itself, allowing adaptation to new understandings of both facts and values").
296. Id. at 206 (citing examples); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 855-86 & n.123 (citing
examples and noting that under pre-Chevron caselaw and Skidmore, longstanding and consistent
interpretations were granted more deference than new or fluctuating interpretations). See also Hick-
man, supra note 225, at 1549 n.46 (pointing to the fact that in Chevron, the Court accepted the
EPA's change in regulatory definitions and deferred to the EPA's new definition that was reached
through note-and-comment rulemaking).
297. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Intemet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)
(describing this as the "whole point of Chevron").
298. Because agencies can adopt more procedures than the minimum statutory and constitu-
tional procedures, they may decide to increase the procedures available, but they should not be able
to decrease them from those required by APA §§ 554, 556, and 557 without a legislative change.
299. See Noah, supra note 250, at 1528 n.201. See also Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public
Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 229 (1997)
(arguing that "it is plausible to believe that there is a range of controversies decided in the courts
where the organizational capacities of the contending parties will have no effect on the outcome").
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Finally, agency expertise is a weak rationale for deference to
agency interpretations of procedural provisions. As with the interpreta-
tion of jurisdictional and judicial review provisions, courts have more
expertise in interpreting procedural requirements. 30 0 And unlike jurisdic-
tional issues, which may be hard to recognize, issues involving proce-
dural provisions are distinct from substantive issues such that Congress,
courts, and agencies can easily recognize them. In the procedural con-
text, particularly procedures for adjudications, the agency does not have
a comparative advantage relating to expertise. Indeed, it is the reverse;
courts have long been the source of procedural requirements, interpreting
such requirements in the Constitution and in statutes. 3° Accordingly,
courts are at least as well-equipped-if not better-equipped-than agen-
cies to interpret procedural provisions. This conclusion lends additional
support to the unlikelihood of implied delegation to agencies for interpre-
tations of these provisions.
3. Agency Self-Interest
The third argument against deference in this context acknowledges
concerns about agency self-interest and accountability, which are rooted
in public choice theory. Public choice theory formally articulates a view
that "has been held for a very long time by most people in the backs of
their minds": "the individual bureaucrat is not attempting to maximize
the public interest very vigorously but is attempting to maximize his or
her own utility just as vigorously as you and 1.,, 3 02 Under Chevron, how-
ever, courts cannot adequately constrain this maximization of self-
interest by agencies: "By stripping courts of primary interpretational au-
thority where Congress has charged an agency with administration of a
statute, Chevron simultaneously disarmed courts from being able to act
in a consistently vigilant manner in policing the boundaries of agency
power.
, 30 3
But see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intensive Judicial Review?, 101
YALE L.J. 31, 80-87 (1991) (arguing that courts are not free from public choice problems because
the same groups that have organizational advantages in legislatures and agencies will have organiza-
tional advantages in courts).
300. See supra Part IV.C
301. See infra note 260. Courts are the final word on procedural due process requirements
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and, consequently, a large
body of caselaw and literature has developed around these requirements. See Adam M. Samaha,
Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 603-04 & n.I (2006) (noting that for the ten-year period of
1995-2005, a Westlaw search in the "JLR" database yielded more than 850 articles with "due proc-
ess" in the title).
302. GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY, GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A
PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 14-15 (2002).
303. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 909.
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Proponents of applying Chevron to agency interpretations of proce-
dural provisions may argue from the standpoint of accountability: "Chev-
ron posited that this value [accountability] supports a rule of deference
because agency officials have connections to political institutions and
through them to the general public that the judiciary does not., 30 4 While
this is true, the political and fiscal pressures that agencies face outweigh
their accountability on this issue; an agency's discretion in interpreting
procedural provisions is susceptible to inappropriate self-interest consid-
erations. Thus, the federal courts' role in upholding constitutional guar-
antees and their accompanying lack of political accountability make the
judiciary the more appropriate institution to decide these issues.30 5
A better argument for applying Chevron in this context rests on the
notion of public participation as a check on agency discretion and ac-
countability. For example, in Dominion Energy, the EPA reinterpreted
the Clean Water Act's procedural provisions through informal notice-
and-comment rulemaking, 30 6 an action that satisfied Mead's force-of-law
test.30 7 The public was thus provided with the opportunity to participate
by filing comments to the proposed change. It is indeed possible that
some members of the public, and even some permit applicants, might
want fewer procedures because the APA's formal procedures can be
lengthy, cumbersome, and more costly; however, the risks of an agency
acting out of self-interest and abusing its discretion in interpreting proce-
dural provisions to avoid formal procedures are simply too great to rely
on public participation as a check on such abuse.
304. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 242. See also David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 112-28 (2000) (analyzing how agencies function differently from politicians
but then concluding that agencies do function much like politicians and that voters "might often
prefer to vest decisionmaking authority in administrative agencies," thereby suggesting a link be-
tween voters and agencies).
305. Admittedly, courts may not be entirely free of public choice problems. See Elhauge, supra
note 299, at 34 and accompanying text. But see Merrill, supra note 299, at 229-30 (agreeing that
although courts are not "wholly immune from the logic of collective action," there are situations
when judicial policy making is "less susceptible to interest group distortions"); Jack M. Beerman,
Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
183, 223 (1991) (indicating that it is difficult to tell how public choice affects the judicial role).
306. Amendments to Streamline the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program
Regulations: Round Two, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,886-01, 30,887-888 (May 15, 2000) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 122); Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir.
2006).
307. In announcing the force of law test in Mead, the Court stated that Chevron deference
would be appropriate where "Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exer-
cise of that authority." 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). The Court clarified that such delegation could
be demonstrated if the agency had the power to engage in informal rulemaking under the APA. See
supra Part IV.B for a discussion of Mead.
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Proponents of applying Chevron deference might counter that any
such risk is slight because the agencies themselves might have reasons to
prefer formal procedures. First, because an agency is a "cost-plus" pro-
vider of services, the costs of procedural formality are externalized on
those who have to deal with it. Thus, the bureaucrats will get paid re-
gardless of the procedure the agency uses, so they may not mind engag-
ing in formal adjudications. Second, agencies are repeat players in adju-
dications. Agencies therefore might favor procedural formalities because
they gain an edge over all other players in mastering the complex rules.
Third, formality has a facial value; it provides at least the appearance of
legitimacy. Fourth, because the procedures may affect substantive rights,
the agency may decide to err on the side of caution and follow formal
procedures or adopt procedures short of the APA's full formal proce-
dures but above the statutory and constitutional minimum.30 8 Finally,
an agency might want to employ formal procedures for a more
self-interested or political reason, such as to slow down the implementa-
tion of an undesirable (in the agency's or the White House's view)
program.
30 9
However, these motivations are largely theoretical; cases like Do-
minion Energy indicate that these motivations do not appear to greatly
influence agency practice relating to procedural provisions. 310 Moreover,
these reasons are outweighed by the primary reason that agencies dislike
increased formality: it decreases agency discretion, that is, the exercise of
power. This reason is highlighted in the jurisdictional context, where
agencies usually act in their self-interest by trying to expand their
powers.31
308. Cf Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27. Professors Merrill and Hickman discuss procedural
rules, which are exempt from informal rulemaking procedures and may be entitled to Chevron defer-
ence. Id. at 905-06. "[G]iven the vague line that divides procedural rules from substantive rules and
the risk of invalidation if the agency guesses wrong," they argue, the agency may opt to go through
notice-and-comment procedures. Id. at 906. Yet under the current structure of the APA, Professors
Merrill and Hickman note, there will be some procedural rules that will be binding because they
have the force of law and thus are entitled to Chevron deference, "notwithstanding that some mem-
bers of the public would like to comment on them before they are adopted but have been denied any
such opportunity. The correspondence between the force-of-law criterion and public participation is
strong, but it is not perfect." Id.
309. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 915, 935 (2005).
310. See Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 18-19 (upholding EPA amendment to rule eliminating
longstanding practice of formal procedures in permit adjudication). See supra notes 18-21 and ac-
companying text regarding why agencies have historically moved away from formal procedures to
informal procedures.
311. See supra Part IV.C. 1. The rationale for not deferring to agencies in the criminal context
recognizes the similar incentives for prosecutorial agencies to interpret criminal statutes expansively.
See Noah, supra note 226, at 1517-18. But see WILSON, supra note 263, at 196-217 (arguing that
agencies do not always want to maximize their power because, among other things, some agencies
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There is no reason to believe that they will not do the same when
interpreting procedural provisions.312 Indeed, agencies have opposed
formal procedures at every step, starting with the inclusion of these pro-
cedures in the APA.313 Even after the enactment of the APA, some agen-
cies ignored the statute's requirements. 1 4 Agencies continue to avoid
formal procedures when given the opportunity.315 Every decided case
regarding agency interpretations of procedural provisions has involved
an agency interpretation of statutory language to provide something less
than formal adjudicatory procedures.31 6 If agencies expect courts to grant
Chevron deference to their interpretations of procedural provisions, we
can expect more agencies to follow the EPA's lead in Dominion Energy
and reduce the procedures available to individuals appearing before an
agency despite longstanding agency practice to the contrary for adjudica-
tions.317 Thus, given these concerns regarding agency self-interest, the
historical tension between deference to agencies and suspicion of agen-
cies' motivations 318 in this context should be resolved in favor of de novo
review.
4. Fundamental Fairness
The final argument against granting Chevron deference to agency
interpretations of procedural provisions is based on fundamental fairness
maximize leisure, or are afraid of having too much jurisdiction because they will be accountable for
more things, or they do what the White House wants).
312. Some argue, however, that agencies are not so predictable. An agency might actually want
to employ slower and more costly formal procedures because it wants to delay implementation of a
program that it does not like, or that the White House does not like. See Levinson, supra note 309.
313. Funk, supra note 18, at 892 & n.86 (noting that agencies opposed the inclusion of formal
requirements while Congress was considering the APA and citing legislative history demonstrating
that much of the debate focused on formal adjudication).
314. Id. at892 & n.87.
315. Id. at 892.
316. See, e.g., Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 12 (1st Cir.
2006) (agency amended rule to eliminate longstanding practice of formal procedures in permit adju-
dication in the name of regulatory efficiency); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d
872, 875-77 (1st Cir. 1978) (agency argued for informal procedures); City of West Chicago v. NRC,
701 F.2d 632, 638-41 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477,
1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same). Granted, there is a sample bias to some extent because these re-
flect only the litigated cases. See supra Part Il.A for a description of formal procedural requirements.
317. See Rakoff, supra note 18, at 163-80 (discussing the growing tendency of agencies to use
informal procedures).
318. See John J. Coughlin, The History of the Judicial Review ofAdministrative Power and the
Future of Regulatory Governance, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 89, 106-29 (2001) (examining this historical
tension between deference and suspicion). See also Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency
Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated
Community as a Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 480-81
(1995) (arguing that agency discretion can be controlled by organic and enabling legislation but that
Congress generally ignores the types of control that adequately cabin discretion).
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concerns grounded in due process principles. Formal adjudicatory proce-
dures clearly meet due process requirements because they employ trial-
type procedures. 319 Anything less than formal procedures, however, is
potentially subject to constitutional challenge. Informal adjudications,
therefore, are particularly susceptible to due process claims. 320 Although
in the seminal 1970 case of Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court
ordered an evidentiary hearing with a panoply of formal procedures,
32'
today due process often demands much less than a full evidentiary
hearing.
3 22
A court determines what procedures satisfy due process under the
three-part analysis articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.323 First, the court
must consider the nature of the private interest at stake.324 Second, the
court must evaluate the risk of erroneous deprivation under the existing
procedures.325 Third, the court must consider the government's inter-
est.326 The court then balances these interests and determines what proc-
ess is due. In applying this framework, the Supreme Court has indicated
that heavily factual issues are often those for which the risk of error is
high.327 In such cases, oral presentations and the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses are important procedures.328 These proce-
dural safeguards serve as a check on agency discretion and reduce the
risk of erroneous deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest.
Although a party could bring a due process challenge to an informal
agency adjudication, the due process concerns raised are relevant to con-
sidering whether deference is appropriate in the procedural provision
context. Fairness in this context is a critical concern because "structuring
319. See supra Part I.A for a description of formal procedural requirements.
320. For example, the petitioners in City of West Chicago and Chemical Waste challenged the
agencies' informal adjudications on due process grounds but were not successful. See supra Part Il
for a discussion of these cases, and notes 86 and 175 for a description of the due process claims.
321. 397 U.S. 254, 264-71 (1970). At issue in Goldberg was the discontinuation of welfare
benefits. Id. at 255. The Court noted that "[i]n almost every setting where important decisions turn
on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses." Id. at 270.
322. Although Goldberg is still good law, the Court has retreated from ordering full eviden-
tiary hearings. Informal "hearings" that provide some opportunity to be heard are often held to be
sufficient. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985) (holding
that an informal hearing is sufficient); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975) (holding that public
schoolchildren must generally receive an informal hearing before being suspended); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976) (holding that an informal hearing for termination of disability
benefits meets due process requirements).




327. Id. at 344-45.
328. id. at 343-44.
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administrative adjudication confronts a crucial competition between bu-
reaucratic management and individualized justice. 329 Many agency ad-
judications involve important private interests or turn on questions of
fact. Yet, as discussed above, when faced with a choice of whether to
provide more or fewer procedures, agencies will typically act in their
self-interest and choose fewer procedures. This will likely occur notwith-
standing fairness concerns. Thus, even where the agency's choice of pro-
cedures is likely to meet the minimum requirements of constitutional due
process, the immediate and concrete effect on individual rights that an
agency's adjudicatory decision has counsels against judicial deference to
agency interpretations in this context. Absent clear congressional intent,
the courts' role should be to ensure that the agency has observed the re-
quirements of fundamental fairness.33 °
Together, these four concerns-implied delegation, institutional
competence, agency self-interest, and fundamental fairness-weigh
heavily in favor of refusing to extend Chevron deference to agency inter-
pretations of procedural provisions in enabling statutes.
Like Chevron deference, Skidmore deference does not make sense
in this context, albeit for a more practical and less theoretical reason.
Skidmore deference typically applies to an agency's informal interpreta-
tions that lack the force of law.331 While some agency interpretations of
procedural provisions may be informal, other interpretations have the
force of law because they are presented in regulations promulgated pur-
suant to notice-and-comment rulemaking. Therefore, under Mead's
"force of law" test, the first set of interpretations-those made infor-
mally-would receive only Skidmore deference, whereas the second
set-those having the force of law-would be entitled to receive Chev-
ron deference. Some might argue that this is a desirable result because it
fits Mead's rationales.332 Despite the appeal of using this discretionary
deference doctrine, such an incongruous result simply cannot be
reconciled.
329. Edles, supra note 32, at 814 (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS 269 (3d ed. 1992)).
330. See Coughlin, supra note 318, at 92 (noting that one of the functions ofjudicial review is
to guarantee that the requirements of fundamental fairness are met).
331. See supra Part IV.B.
332. For detailed discussions of Mead's rationales, see Thomas Merrill & Kathryn Tongue
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REv. 467
(2002). See also articles cited supra note 244-46 and accompanying text.
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B. De Novo Contextual Review
Although Skidmore deference may seem like the best compro-
mise,333 the above analysis indicates that procedural provisions must lie
beyond both Chevron's and Skidmore's domains. The best answer, then,
is to deny deference to agency interpretations of procedural provisions.3 34
An agency's familiarity with a statute and expertise in its application
may well influence a court, "but the court must remain the final arbiter of
statutory meaning., 335 De novo review by the court is thus the most ap-
propriate approach.
The conclusion that courts should not defer to agencies when inter-
preting procedural provisions requires a second level of inquiry: whether
courts instead should utilize a presumption favoring formal or informal
adjudicatory procedures. While presumptions are tempting because of
their simplicity and efficiency, a case-by-case contextual approach is
more appropriate.
Some commentators have argued for legislative change, with the
primary movement embodied by the American Bar Association (ABA)
Section on Administrative Law's recommendation that Congress amend
the APA to codify Seacoast's presumption in favor of formal procedures
absent clear congressional intent to the contrary. 336 The First Circuit's
recent shift away from Seacoast, however, somewhat weakens the
ABA's proposal. The ABA should be commended, however, on its ef-
forts to urge Congress to draft statutes carefully and to clearly indicate
what type of adjudicatory procedures should be followed.
Professor Gary Eldes also urges legislative change, renewing the
argument of Professors Pierce, Shapiro, and Verkuil that Congress
should amend the APA to provide minimum criteria for informal
333. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 882, 887, 889-920 (arguing for Skidmore
deference for a number of step-zero issues). For a discussion of Skidmore deference, see supra Part
IV.B.
334. Another way to characterize this conclusion is as an argument to apply Skidmore, which
provides for no deference, or de novo review, at one end of the sliding scale of deference. See supra
Part IV.B; Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
335. Noah, supra note 250, at 1528.
336. See American Bar Association Resolution 113 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.
org/jd/ncalj/pdf/resI 13.pdf. The ABA Resolution proposes the following legislative change:
[l]n order to preserve the uniformity of process and of qualifications of presiding officers
contemplated by the APA, Congress should amend the APA to provide prospectively
that, absent a statutory requirement to the contrary in any future legislation that creates
the opportunity for a hearing in an adjudication, such a hearing shall be subject to 5
U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557.
Id. The ABA recently reiterated its position to the U.S. House of Representatives. See supra note 33
and accompanying text.
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hearings.337 These scholars propose adding a requirement that agencies
"provide in all informal adjudications, other than those that rely upon
physical inspection, the minimum procedural safeguards of notice, an
opportunity to present views orally or in writing, a brief statement of rea-
sons, and an impartial decisionmaker." 338 Such an amendment would be
desirable because it would reduce the APA's "feast or famine" dichot-
omy for adjudications, increasing fairness without compromising
efficiency.339
But "caution should be the watchword before amending the APA to
prescribe significantly more precise procedures or review provisions. 340
Efforts to clarify or dictate the standard of review may end up confusing
more than clarifying. 341 Moreover, on a practical level, given Congress's
general reluctance to amend the APA,342 it is unlikely that Congress will
revise it anytime in the near future.
In the absence of general legislative change, specific statutory clar-
ity, or a resolution of the longstanding circuit split by the Supreme Court,
courts need guidance. This Article seeks to provide that guidance by rec-
ommending a contextual approach.343 Although a contextual approach
337. Edles, supra note 32, at 816-18. Some, but not all, of these requirements appear in APA
§ 555. See 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2006) and supra note 49.
338. Edles, supra note 32, at 817 (arguing against the ABA proposal).
339. Id. at 818.
340. William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable Value ofAmending the APA,
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 979, 1001-02 (2004) (arguing that the diversity of types of agency actions that
exist today make it difficult to codify more precise statutory guidance with regard to both review-
ability and deference standards). See also Craig N. Oren, Be Careful What You Wish For: Amending
the Administrative Procedure Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1141, 1149-55 (2004) (discussing the history
of congressional attempts to amend the APA). But see Andersen, supra note 146, at 961 (arguing for
legislative change to the APA). Further, agreeing on how to draft a reasonably comprehensive set of
rules governing adjudications would be difficult. Scholars have articulated different views on the
precise rules they recommend. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 33, at 1016-20 (distinguishing between
"Type A" adjudications, which must be conducted in accordance with §§ 556 and 557 of the APA,
and "Type B" adjudications, which include "an agency evidentiary proceeding required by statute,
other than a Type A adjudication," and drafting a model statute for the incorporation of this distinc-
tion); Howarth, supra note 32, at 1046-54 (supporting both Asimow's and the ABA's proposed
amendments to the APA); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That Wags the Dog: Ex Post
and Ex Ante Constraints on Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057, 1069-75 (2004) (sug-
gesting "minimal procedural safeguards in informal adjudications that significantly affect a particu-
larized individual interest").
341. See Araiza, supra note 340, at 999.
342. Congress has amended the APA very little since its enactment in 1946. It therefore seems
unlikely that Congress will adopt the ABA's proposal, especially in light of the recent First Circuit
decision in Dominion Energy. See supra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of Dominion Energy.
343. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (holding that due process "is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands" and balancing
the governmental and private interests affected) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
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may be somewhat less predictable and less uniform than a presumption,
its advantages are significant. First, a contextual approach is ultimately
more efficient because the court's approach is tailored to each individual
case and thus avoids unnecessary procedures and costs. 344 Second, the
flexible nature of a case-by-case approach avoids some of the concerns
about the "ossification" of statutory interpretation and adjudicatory pro-
cedures. 345 Third, this approach best reflects the reality in agency adjudi-
cations, which have been moving away from formal procedures in all
circumstances since the 1960s.346 Finally, this approach is the most fair
and protective of individual rights because it takes into account the na-
ture of the issues in each case.
A presumption, in contrast, could be underinclusive or overinclu-
sive and is therefore inefficient.347 The presumption in favor of informal
procedures articulated in West Chicago348 is based on two faulty assump-
tions about the APA's adjudicatory procedures and, consequently, it is
underinclusive. The first assumption is that the APA drafters intended
the adjudicatory provisions to apply only in a limited subset of adjudica-
tory decisions by federal agencies. 349 This assumption is not supported
by history.350 The second assumption is that the APA's formal proce-
dures "will always require the agency to engage in a cumbersome, costly
proceeding with all the procedural trappings of a civil trial.",35' This
344. Of course, the expenditure of judicial resources in a case-by-case approach also has some
costs.
345. See Edles, supra note 32, at 813-14 (arguing that the ABA's proposal of a presumption in
favor of formal procedures would "ossify" the adjudication process by being unnecessarily burden-
some and costly). For this reason, a contextual approach is also preferable to a legislative amend-
ment. Legislation would literally codify whatever approach was selected. Two different risks flow
from such a codification. First, statutory formulas may become too ossified, "hindering desirable
administrative evolution." See Araiza, supra note 340, at 999. Second, statutory formulas "may fail
to capture the full complexity of the issue they attempt to address, thus becoming empty vessels that
find meaning only in judicial application." Id. (arguing that the key provisions of the APA have
survived because they are worded broadly enough to accommodate changes in regulatory philosophy
and the role ofjudicial review).
346. Araiza, supra note 340, at 999. See also Rakoff, supra note 18, at 163.
347. See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Re-
visited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 36-37 (2000) (examining the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness
of rules).
348. See supra Part I.A.1 for discussion of this case.
349. Howarth, supra note 32, at 1047.
350. The legislative history of the APA, as well as the APA's goal of achieving uniformity in
administrative practice and procedure, favor the broad applicability of adjudicatory provisions.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 21-22
(2d session 1946). See also Howarth, supra note 32, at 1047-51 (discussing at length the reasons
why the APA's drafters intended the adjudicatory procedures to apply broadly); ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 41-43 (1947) (describing situa-
tions in which adjudicatory hearings are held absent "on the record" language).
351. Howarth, supra note 32, at 1047.
Seattle University Law Review
assumption is more accurate; 352 however, procedural protections are
hardly negative when individual rights are at issue.
353
The presumption in favor of formal procedures suggested by Sea-
coast3 54 is also flawed. Although it is more protective of substantive
rights, it is also overinclusive, and thus less efficient, because it pre-
scribes formal procedures for every encounter with ambiguous statutory
language. Finally, presumptions are constraining. Neither the West Chi-
cago nor the Seacoast presumption allows the court the ability to take the
nature of the issue into account in each case.
As opposed to the bright-line rule of Chevron or a presumption, the
contextual approach employs factors that provide guidance to courts. 355
The analytical framework for review under this approach is two-tiered.
The court should first conduct a de novo review of the statutory language
and relevant legislative history. This is essentially the same analysis as
Chevron's step one. If, however, the type of procedures required is still
unclear, the court should continue with its de novo review and consider
two factors: the nature of the issue and the type of procedures tradition-
ally used in resolving the issue. These factors are grounded in both
caselaw and the goals of procedural formality, which include promoting
accuracy in agency fact-finding; providing an opportunity to be heard to
352. Although agencies complain-and courts accept as true-the complaint that formal pro-
cedures are too costly and time consuming, "[It]here is no empirical support for such an indictment of
APA adjudication." Funk, supra note 18, at 892. APA §§ 554, 556, and 557 actually provide a good
deal of flexibility to the agency, such as the ability to determine whether cross-examination is neces-
sary, which can reduce the cost and delay of a proceeding. Id. at 892-93.
353. Admittedly, this is a normative argument that protecting individual rights is more impor-
tant than the government's interest in saving costs. In Jerry L. Mashaw's terms, my position is one of
"liberal legality" that features the protection of individual rights. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED,
CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 1, 115 (Yale U. Press
1997) (an excellent and insightful discussion of modem administrative law from a public choice
perspective). Others may disagree. See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 301 (examining whether the due
process doctrine pays adequate attention to the costs of government decisionmaking). Under a
Mathews v. Eldridge type of analysis, these interests would be balanced along with the risk of erro-
neous deprivation. See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
354. See supra Part III.A.2 for discussion of this case.
355. In this sense, it is akin to Skidmore's sliding scale of deference. I have discussed the dif-
ference between rules and standards in my previous work. See Melissa M. Berry, Seeking Clarity in
the Federal Habeas Fog: Determining What Constitutes "Clearly Established" Law Under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 818-19 (2005) (citing
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381-82 (1985)). See also Isaac Ehrlich
& Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974)
(distinguishing rules from standards on the grounds of precision and generality); Roscoe Pound,
Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV. 475, 482, 485 (1933)
(defining rules as prescribing "definite detailed legal consequence[s] to a definite, [set of] detailed
.. facts," and standards as specifying a general limit of permissible conduct requiring application
in view of the particular facts of the case); Korobkin, supra note 347, at 31-59 (comparing the costs
and benefits of rules and standards using economic analysis and behavioral analysis).
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persons affected by agency decisions; enhancing agency decisionmaking;
and facilitating judicial review by providing a record of agency
decisionmaking.356
The first factor that courts should consider in determining the ap-
propriateness of requiring a formal APA adjudication is the nature of the
issue. This concerns both the adversarial nature of the issue 35 7 and the
significance of the issue. With regard to the adversarial nature of the is-
sue, as in due process jurisprudence, those issues that require fact-finding
on claims likely to be disputed are issues that should require formal ad-
judicatory procedures. 358 For example, when assessing witness demeanor
is important, oral testimony and opportunity for cross-examination are
crucial.359 By contrast, when facts are less likely to be disputed or are
technical or scientific matters, informal procedures are more appropri-
ate. 360 Furthermore, when a court needs to make specific factual findings
on disputed issues, the adjudication is less likely to be a general policy
decision for which informal procedures may be more desirable.
361
Similarly, the significance of the issue to the affected individual or
entity is critical to examine. The more substantial the impact, the more
important it is that the rights are protected by formal procedures. 362 For
example, formal procedures are more necessary when the issues "involve
substantial impact on personal liberties or freedom, orders that carry with
them a finding of criminal-like culpability, an imposition of sanctions
with substantial economic effect on a party or interested person, or a de-
termination of discrimination under civil rights or analogous laws. 363
The second factor that courts should examine is "[w]hether the ad-
judication would be similar to, or the functional equivalent of, a current
type of adjudication in which an administrative law judge presides. 36 4 In
other words, does the adjudication implicate interests traditionally pro-
356. STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 480 (6th ed. 2006) (listing goals of procedural
formalities).
357. See Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 246 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2001).
358. See supra notes 92-93, 327, and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970).
360. See, e.g., City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 646 (7th Cir. 1983).
361. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876 (1st Cir. 1978).
362. Again, this is consistent with due process jurisprudence. Compare Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
264-65 (finding that discontinuation of welfare benefits was an essential interest critical to survival
that warrants a high level of procedures), with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976)
(reasoning that discontinuation of disability benefits was not as essential as welfare benefits because
disability benefits are not need-based).
363. American Bar Association Resolution 113 (2005) available at http://www.abanet.org/
jd/ncalj/pdf/resI 13.pdf.American Bar Association Resolution 113 (2005).
364. Id.
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tected by formal APA procedures? If so, formal procedures should be
required.365 For example, the types of issues identified above would
likely meet this factor. Although this approach rejects deference to
agency legal interpretations, it can take the agency's practice into ac-
count by asking whether the agency has traditionally provided formal
procedures, and the agency's reasoning for its choice of procedures
would be a relevant consideration.366
Requiring formal procedures for cases that meet these factors re-
flects the goals of procedural formalities: it encourages accuracy in
agency fact-finding by allowing, among other things, oral testimony,
cross-examination, and an impartial decisionmaker, which in turn en-
hances agency decisionmaking and constrains agency discretion, and it
provides an opportunity for affected parties to be heard. Finally, by creat-
ing a record, formal proceedings also facilitate meaningful judicial
review.
This contextual approach allowing for independent judicial judg-
ment is the best solution in the absence of statutory clarity or legislative
367change. Courts have a duty to interpret statutes, and this is a duty with
which they are very familiar. 368 The performance of this duty is not a
self-promoting struggle for power by the judiciary.369 Rather, it reflects
the court's appropriate role, given the many concerns raised by granting
deference to agency interpretations of procedural provisions in their
enabling statutes.
365. See, e.g., Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 246 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2001) (granting
fee recovery for adversary adjudications of debarment "[b]ecause the adjudication of debarment is
required by statute, is adversarial in nature, appears intended by legislation to be covered by the
APA, and implicates interests traditionally protected by APA procedures").
366. See Edles, supra note 32, at 796-807. This factor also takes into account due process
jurisprudence. See id. See also City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 647 (7th Cir. 1983)
(expressing concern, from a due process perspective, regarding whether there was adequate notice
that agency was shifting from formal procedures to informal procedures).
367. Granted, this approach means that only two choices exist: formal or informal procedures.
Unlike Mathews v. Eldridge's balancing test, it does not allow for a balancing of interests that might
result in procedures falling somewhere between formal procedures and those procedures which
merely meet minimum constitutional due process requirements. This type of balancing, however, is
not permissible under Vermont Yankee, see supra note 52, nor is it necessarily desirable because it
could be considerably less predictable. Yet APA formal procedures do allow for some degree of
flexibility by the decisionmaker, thus reducing the dichotomy between formal and informal adjudi-
catory procedures. See supra note 352.
368. See, e.g., Anval Nyby Powder AB v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 463, 469 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1996) (finding that the "court's statutory obligation [under 28 U.S.C. § 2643b (1994)] to find the
correct result limited the court's ability to give special Chevron deference" to agency interpretation).
369. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many statutes lack a clear statement as to whether adjudications are
subject to formal APA procedures. This ambiguity has caused confusion
and controversy as courts have struggled with how to determine whether
formal procedures are triggered in any particular case. Taking advantage
of this ambiguity, many agencies have decided not to conduct adjudica-
tions subject to the protections of formal procedures. As agencies have
moved away from formal procedures, another disturbing trend has ap-
peared in the name of efficiency: the trend is now for courts to grant
Chevron deference to agencies' interpretations of the procedural provi-
sions in their enabling statutes.
This trend should end before it gains further support. The rationales
underlying Chevron deference-implied delegation and agency exper-
tise-fail to support deference in this context. Moreover, such deference
maximizes the opportunity for agency discretion and its accompanying
concerns about self-interest while potentially decreasing fairness to regu-
lated parties. Instead of deferring to agencies, courts should interpret
statutory procedural provisions using a de novo contextual approach.
This approach recognizes the courts' expertise and institutional compe-
tence in interpreting statutory procedural provisions as well as the crucial
need for procedural formalities to protect individual rights from agency
self-interest and arbitrariness. It is the best way to ensure that rights are
properly protected because "disputed matters of real substance will be
settled by procedures of real dignity.,
370
370. Rakoff, supra note 18, at 162.
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